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INTRODUCTION. 
Ue ought to speak of God. Ue are huaan, ho~ever, and so 
cannot speak of God. Ue ought therefore to recognise both 
our obligation and our inability and by that very 
recognition give God the glory. This is our perplexity. The 
rest of our task fades into insignificance in comparison. 1 
But the claim is issued ••• in spite of our powerlessness. It 
is disclosed to us that we do not view and think of God, 
that we cannot speak of Him; and because this is disclosed 
to us, it is brought home that this is the very thing which 
has to happen no matter what the circumstances, that we must 
not fail to do it •.• it is impossible for man not to proceed 
to think of God, or be silent about God. When it is issued, 
man is convicted of his inability to think and speak of God. 
And when it is issued, it is required of man that in spite 
of his inability, and even in his inability, he should still 
do both. (CD II,1 p212l 2 
The paradox evident in these quotations from Barth's writings 
forms the centre of his theology. On the onf: hand, hLtmani ty i !::; 
incapable of speaking of God. On the other hand, it is imperative 
for humanity to speak of God. This dilemma is resolved by God's 
act for humanity in Jesus Christ, giving rise to a human response 
of fa~th and obedience. Humanity can speak of God only because 
God has revealed Godself. Hence, all theology and praxis begins 
doxologically, in praise for God's initiative of grace. 
This thesis proposes that Barth's perception of this initiative 
of God is best e:·:press£~d in the r.:oncept L">f the revolution of God, 
which provides a paradigm from which to recover the liberative 
and humanising intention of his theology. this t:hecil ogy 
implies human praxis which participates in the divinely 
instituted process of transforming human reality. In this way 
Barth simultaneously speaks of God and humanity, "''i thout 
confusing the deity of God and the humanness of humanity. This 
provides a way beyond both quietism and the legitimation of 
1 
power, choosing instead permanent confrontation with power in the 
interest of true humanisation. 
Such an approach is suggested by Paul Lehmann in a 1972 article 
Barth as a "theolc)<Jian of permanent revolution". 2 
Also, in the same year, the doctoral thesis of Frederich-Wilhelm 
Marquardt devotes significant attention to Barth's concept of the 
revolution of Gad within his analysis of Barth's socialism. 3 This 
thesis is a more extensive analysis of the revolution of God 
within the wider framework of Barth's theology. 
Hethodology. 
Methodological 1 y this thesis devi?.l ops II f ram praxis to theory and 
back" under the assumption that it is pra>:is i,,hich verifies 
theory. 5 
The first chapter, rather than providing a biographical outline, 
uses the method of 'theology as biography' to theologically 
analyse· specific activities in Barth's life, enquiring whether 
his praxis justifies deeper examination of the concept of God's 
revolution. Because of the doxological starting point of Barth's 
theology his appreciation of Mozart provides a logical frame of 
r~ference within which three events are considered: Firstly, his 
response to the 1914 manifesto signed by German liberals 
legitimating the military policy of the kaiser; !::-econdly, his 
refusal to make the oath of allegiance to Hitler; and finally, 




With this foundation, the second chapter analyses the development 
of the concept of the revolution of God in his early theology, 
from the pastorate at Geneva and Safenwil to professorship at 
Gottingen and Munster. Barth's quest for a way of simultaneously 
speaking about God and humanity without separating or uniting the 
two is prompted by disatisfation with liberal and religious-
socialist models, grows into a dialectic approach, and matures in 
an analogical method based on Anselm of Canterbury. 
In chapter three analogical thinking is examined as the 
epistemological basis of God's revolution. In the Anselmian 
concept of God as aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit Barth 
finds an understanding of God sufficiently radical to be the 
Archimedean point upon which all reality depends. Here God is 
understood as the self-existent One who, by grace, takes the 
initiative for humanity in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. God 
in Godself is also God for humanity. This implicit 
inseparability of the being and the act of God finds its 
historical analogy in the Chalcedonian two-natures christology. 
Jesus Christ, as truly God and truly human, 
manifestation of the revolution of God. 
is the historical 
Jesus Christ, as the revolution of God, is the exclusive subject 
of the fourth chapter. Here Chalcedonian christology is analysed, 
and the implications of Barth's understanding of the person of 
Jesus are explored. It is argued that Jesus ~mbodies the 
revolution of God which seeks to bring true and full life to 
humanity. The historical correspondence of Jesus, as the 'royal 
man', to the being and act of God leads to three conclusions: 
3 
Fil'"st.ly, a human community based on radical solidarity with the 
poor and lowly; secondly, the de-absolutising of all human 
thinking ,and action under the No o·f Gt:>d;· and thirdly, the 
decisive Yes of God to the human search for the best historical 
analogies to God's revolution. 
Finally, the fifth chapter deals with questions about the 
relationship between God's revolution and human revolution. Here 
it is concluded that, read from the perspective of the revolution 
of God, Barth's theology always demands revolutionary human 
praxis geared to the transformation of reality. God's No de-
absolutises human movements of resistance to ensure that human 
praxis does not merely replace one form of oppression with 
another. The Yes of God inspires the permanent human quest for 
true human life corresponding to God's love and justice. 
Because of the importance of the re-reading of Barth to current 
issues, debate with contemporary theological formulations is 
unavoidable. Nonetheless, it is not the intention of this thesis 
to compare Barth to other theologies. Rather it is to understand 
from 'within' the contribution of the concept of God's revolution 
to theological discourse and human praxis. 
the pervasiveness of political issues in the context 
from which this thesis is written determines that these issue$ be 
given methodological priority. However, it is recognised that the 
of God has the broadest implications ·for ,:111 
dimensions of christian ethics. 
4 
In summation, the revolution of God provides a hermeneutical key 
which exposes the liberative nature of Barth's theology. In this 
God and humanity, theory and practice, faith and concept 
history, and theology and politics, are creatively related 
without divinising the former, nor denying the latter. This means 
that theology moves within the frontiers of politics without 
ceasing to be theology. It has the tasks of keeping politics human 
and ensuring that human revolutions actually bring qualitative 
transformation. 
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THE REVOLUTION OF GOD: A THEOLOGICAL-BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH. 
Many biographical resumes of the life of Karl Barth have been 
written and another would be superfluous. There is a need for a 
different approach, found in the concept of 'theology as 
biography', providing access to the theological concepts implicit 
in the life of the person concerned. This approach, as introduced 
by McClendon, hypothesises that theologians "may do bett£.~r· work" 
if attention is given to "compelling biographies". 1 It is the 
examination of how life is lived under the governance of a 
particular vision of God and human existence. The central 
assumption is that "a theoloqy on the basis of biographical 
~xperience •.• may shed light on'' affirmations about God. 2 
Implicit here is the dialectic of praxis and theory in human 
1 if e. Biography, as the arena of this dialectic, uncover .. s how 
praxis and theory interrelate. Bi ogr·aphi cal pra>:i s is the 
'window' into the life of the subject, upon which basis critical 
theological reflection is possible. Metz describes this as 
follc>Ws: 
Theological reflection can be e~pressed in the biographical 
mediation of theory and praxis as the biography of a life 
led on the basis of faith or as the history of the witness 
borne every day to that life. 3 
ConsF.:iquent 1 y, 'theology as biography' is theological re-flf'2c:tion 
on the praxis of the subject considered, in order to better grasp 
the life-vision of that subject. It is not simply biography 
because the agenda is explicitly theological, nor is it entirely 
theology for the basis of reflection is biography. Through 
bioqraphy the thec::)lO<;.lical search ·for the "essential metaphor" is 
8 
undertaken by examining the biographical subject's use of 
traditional human symbols. 4 
Lehmann suggests that Barth's theological quest was for an 
essential metaphor which gave expression to ''the humanity of God 
for the sake of the humanisation of human life in this world and 
the next•·.~ Following thi.s suggestion, the purpose of this 
chapter is to reveal how Barth's quest is expressed in specific 
biographical incidents. And further, because no theology or 
biography is ever totally objective, the specific question asked 
here is does Barth's practice lend credence to the assertion that 
this 'essential metaphor' can be paradigmatically summarised· as 
the revolution of God. Differently stated this asks: What, in the 
praxis of Karl Barth, justifies a deeper enquiry into the concept 
of the revolution of God? How is the revolution of God grounded 
in his life and what light does this praxis throw onto the 
concept of the revolution of God? 
Of necessity, therefore, the biographical sketch that follows is 
selective. The intention is to do theology using biography not 
merely to retell a well told story. To this end four cameos of 
Barth's life are considered. His appreciation of Mozart broadly 
reflects central characteristics of his theology. Within this 
framework the subsequent three incidents illustrate the praxis 
implicit in his theology. These three incidents are firstly, 
Barth's response to the manifesto of liberal intellectuals in 
1914· ' secondly, his refusal to take the oath of allegiance to 
Hitler; and finally, his attitude to the East-West conflict after 
9 
the inclusion of Hungary into the Eastern bloc. Although diverse, 
these foci on Barth's life find a common theological centre in 
his understanding of the revolution of God. 
1.1 MOZART AND THE FREEDOM OF GOD. 
The centre of Barth's appreciation of Mozart is found in the 
freedom with which the composer practised his art. Barth 
perceives in Mozart's music an unparalleled human correspondence 
to the freedom of God. Mozart embodies an attitude which reflects 
a rootedness in a revolution which comes from God, and yet at the 
same time enables human participation in the fulness of life. As 
Barth confesses in his Letter of Thanks to Mozart: 
But, 
With an ear open to your musical dialectic, one can be old 
and become young, can work and rest, be content and sad: in 
short, one can live. 6 
in Mozart, this does not imply a cautious and 
equilibri.um: 
We will never h~ar in Mozart an equilibrium of forces and a 
consequent uncertainty and doubt. 7 
On the contrary: 
What occurs in Mozart is rather a glorious upsetting of the 
balance, a turning in which the light rises and the shadows 
fall, though without disappearing, in which joy overtakes 
sorrow without extinguishing it, in which the Yea rings 
louder than the ever present Nay. 8 
This turning establishes the permanent confrontation 
bal ;,~need 
bet1o-Jeen 
light and shadows, joy and sorrow, justice ;;~nc:I i njust:i ce, in 
which the certainty of the triumph of the former over the latter 
is assured and even achieved. And because of the certainty of 
victory there is a freedom for life which cannot be discouraged 
or dissipated by adversity. Barth theologically locates the 
"mysterious centre" 9 of Mozart's music, and thus the source of 
1 (> 
this revolutionary freedom, in the grace disclosed to humanity in 
.Jesus Christ. God's original revolution is the tuYning which 
allows the 'light to rise' and the 'shadows' to fall. BecaL1se of 
this revolutionary centre, Mozart's music (and Barth's theology 
and pra>:is) includes a certain "reckles~;ness" which libE~r,ates the 
hearer for a fuller experience of human life. '.Ji 11 a·-Vi c:encio 
aptly concludes: 
When this "recklessness" transcends his <Barth's) music 
appreciation and penetrates his politics it is realised that 
Barth was no more a cautious and balanced political 
theologian than Mozart was a theologian of equlilibrium. 10 
This exposes the anarchistic tendency in Barth's thinking to 
which more attention will be given in the final chapter. 
Yet the freedom der.ived from the certainty of victory does not 
imply chaos, but has distinct limitations beyond which freedom 
ceases to be freedom. 
From the beginning, he (Mozart) moved freely within the 
limits of the musical laws of his time ••• But he did not 
revolt against these laws; he did not break them. 11 
Mozart used the musical law to express his freedom rather than 
re~strain it, in short, he played within the limits of li·fe's 
possibilities. Liberated from the primary need to prove, confess 
or communicate something, his music almost unconsciously issues, 
in its humility, in the praise of God. Barth concludes that in 
contrast to Bach and Beethoven, Mozart does not wish to say 
anything: 
Mozart does not wish to say anything: he just sings and 
sounds. Thus he does not force anything on the listener, 
does not de~and that he make any decisions or take any 
positions; he simply leaves him free. Nor does he will to 
proclaim the praise of God. He just does it - precisely in 
that humility in which he himself is, so to speak, only the 
11 
instrument with which he allows us to hear what he hears: 
what surges at him from God's creation, what rises in him, 
and must proceed from him. 12 
In this way the relationship between the revolutionary centre of 
his music and the composer himself is made explicit. For Barth, 
Mozart embodies a prime example of the the way in which human 
freedom simply reflects the freedom of its master. It provides 
the framework within which life is to be taken seriously, but not 
ultimately so, for only God is absolutely serious. On the other 
hand it portrays human life as a game with limits and 
possibilities, and the one who plays it well is able to explore 
the possibilities without transcending the limits. Because the 
··turning' that makes true human life possible is beyond human 
control, all real human existence and action reflects, and is 
both limited and inspired by the revolution, the turning, that 
comes from God. 
1.2 LIBERAL THEOLOGY AND THE BASIS OF POLITICAL ACTION. 
Whilst recognising that a long process was responsible for 
Barth's break from liberal theology, a single event stands out as 
the point of no return. (The process is examined more closely in 
the next chapter.) More than any other incident, the signing of a 
manifesto in support of Kaiser Wilhelm II's military policy by 
ninety-three German intellectuals, including many of Barth's 
teachers, represented the failure of liberal theology. Barth, at 
that time a pastor in Safenwil, described his response in these 
weirds: 
For me personally a day at the beginning of August in that 
year (1914) was the dies ater, when ninety-three German 
intellectuals published an endorsement of the military 
policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his councillors, on which to 
12 
my horror I found the names of almost all the theological 
te~chers whom hitherto I had confidently respected. If they 
could be so mistaken in ethos, I noted that it was quite 
impossible for me to adhere any longer to their ethics or 
dogmatics ••• So far as I was concerned, there was no more 
future for the theology of the 19th century. 13 
Liberal theology, with its emphasis on religious experience, 
revealed its social captivity to the prevailing stuctures of 
authority. The failure of his theological masters to extricate 
themselves from the Kaiser's ideology of war indicated, for 
Barth, a deficiency in their theological method and foundation. 
The critical theological factor was that the god of liberal 
theology did not provide an adequate basis for liberating social 
action. At the same time Barth was equally disillusioned with the 
prevailing socialist models. As early as 1911, on the basis of 
his experience with workers at Safenwil, Barth had criticised the 
Swiss religious socialists for failing to live up to their own 
goals. Theologically, for Barth, the connection between the 
kingdom of God and socialist praxis had been too clearly 
established. Barth insisted that because he could not identify 
with the ethos of these intellectuals and socialists he also had 
to question their ethics and dogmatics. 14 
Yet, his reaction to both these positions was more than 
intellectual indignation at a poor theological model. It was a 
questioning of theological foundations because of the praxis 
which emerged from them. Further, Barth's response was more than 
a critique of particular theologians, it was a negation of the 
god presupposed by an entire theological ethos in the interests 
of the true, radical God. In a real sense this moment 
represented the 'death' of the liberal god for Barth. Any god 
13 
which was so easily co-opted into a status quo or organically 
connected to an insufficiently radical alternative, could not be 
God at all. At the root of the failure of both liberalism and 
religious-socialism Barth discerned a deficient doctrine of God. 
The practice of the intellectuals, particularly of hi$ respected 
teachers, and a critique of prevailing socialist praxis led to a 
renewed search for a sound theological foundation for social 
praxis. 
Significantly, Barth did not arrive at this insight solely as a 
result of an intellectual dilemma, nor did the need for a new 
understanding of God emerge from religious experience. It was 
concrete political reality that exposed the inadequacies of 
prevailing theological models and necessitated new ones. 
This had two distinct consequences for Barth's theology. 
On the one hand, from that time the ruling passion of Barth's 
theology was the affirmation of God as God in contrast to all 
else. The search was for a concept of God which obviate~ all 
hyphens and syntheses between heaven and earth~ liberating God 
from ideological captivity. On the other hand, Barth's pre-
occupation with theology was for the sake of an adequate basis 
for human praxis. This 'wholly other' God was at once 
transcendent and immanent. Implicit in this discovery are the two 
poles of the dialectic in the theology of the revolution of God: 
a situation which is in need of radical negation and 
transformation on the one hand, and God who calls all human 
achievement and systems into question on the other. The 
14 
l<i.+:!rkegaardian "infinite qualitative distinction" between God and 
humanity was firmly established in Barth's mind and theology.1~ 
Whilst theology begins with praxis, only this 'wholly other' God 
is sufficiently radical to provide adequate impetus for ongoing 
human participation in the transformation of reality. Notably, 
Barth did not turn exclusively to socialism to find an 
alternative basis for praxis, although he remained a committed 
socialist for the rest of his life. He turned to theology to find 
a "better basis for .•• social action". 16 This enabled him, in the 
name of the true revolution of God, to maintain a critical 
distance from all human options. His disillusionment with 
religious-socialism indicates this. From thi~ time Barth wa6 
conscious of his own praxis being no more than a parable of the 
pra>( is of God. His actions could only point to the revolution of 
God. 
This did not, however, place Barth into neutral paralysis of 
pra:·: is. Indeed, the refusal to conform to the military policy of 
the Kaiser was itself radical praxis. And further, in 1915 after 
formally joining the Swiss Social Democratic Party he wrote to 
his friend Thurneysen: "f;aith in the greatest does not e>:clude 
but includes within it work and suffering in the realm of the 
imperfect''. 17 The revolution of God did not absolve him from 
participation in the business of human politics. On the contrary, 
it compelled him to seek and support the best human options 
available. God's revolution both inspires and limits human 
' 
.,,ct :i. on. To use Barth's later words: The revolution of the wholly 
other God contains both God's No and Yes to humanity. 
15 
The impetus for Barth's ··new' approach was shaped by the 
prevailing social conditions and the theological responses 
thereto. It was with a preoccupation with praxis, particularly in 
the industrial context of Safenwil, that Barth emphasised the 
dynamic dialectic between social reality and theological theory. 
Against the collapse of dialectic thinking evident in both the 
liberal identification with German Nationalism and the religious-
socialist confusion of the kingdom of God with the Marxian 
utopia, Barth reasserted God as wholly other. A theology based on 
rt:~l i gi OLIS experience was exchanged for an eschatoloqically 
conceived theology. The liberal question of who God is for 
humanity was transformed into the question of who God is in 
Godself as a basis for God's being for humanity. 
1.3 GOD'S REVOLUTION AND HITLER: THE LIMITS OF HUMAN AUTHORITY 
AND FREEDOM. 
In 1934, as a professor at Bonn University, Barth refused to make 
the required oath of allegiance to Hitler. Few incidents in 
Barth's life more powerfully illustrate the implications of his 
theology of the revolution of God. By refusing to make the oath 
Barth praxiologically defined the limits of human authority and 
·freedom implicit in God's revolution. He was saying that Hitler 
did not have the authority to require such an oath and he <Barth) 
did not have the freedom to comply with the oath. 
In the revolution of God, by definition, ~11 human authority and 
freedom is limited and derived from the authority and freedom of 
God. Firstly, with regard to authority Barth saw it as his 
responsibility to the state under Hitler to proclaim the limits 
16 
of its dominion. Thus Barth's action, whilst seeming to be 
against the state was actually done for the sake of the state. 
The refusal to take the oath was not the rebellious act of a 
political anarchist but the responsible act of a true patriot. 18 
As a professor Barth saw himself as a "state appointed guardian" 
of the limitations placed by God on human authority. 1 • The 
refusal was meant as a call to repentance to the prevailing order 
in the interests of just and· true government. The sovereignty of 
God demanded resistance against the existing government in the 
interests of better government. Again the ruling passion of the 
first commandment implied that the authority of the political 
order is derived from the authority of God. Government can only 
require allegiance from its subjects that does not conflict with 
ultimate allegiance to God. It must be noted that Barth was 
willing to make the oath if it included a qualifying statement. 
In Barth's words: 
I did not refuse to give the official oath, 
an addition to the effect that I could be 
Fuhrer only within my responsibilities as 
Christian. 20 
but stipulated 
loyal to the 
an Evangelical 
Consequently and secondly, with regard to freedom Barth saw his 
own freedom as limited by the freedom of God. Compliance with the 
prescribed oath would have constituted a breach of the freedom of 
God in the name of his own freedom. God alone is absolutely free~ 
Human beings derive their freedom from God's freedom. Barth was 
simply not free to make the oath. He was confronted with the 
classical choice between obedience to God and obedience to human 
authority. In such a situation the Christian is only free to obey 
God. To refuse to obey God is to surrender the freedom of God, 
17 
and th~s human freedom. It is to choose captivity. Barth chose 
freedom and paid the human price for that choice. 
In praxis the supreme authority and freedom of God has far 
reaching consequences. It requires of the Christian to constantly 
weigh up all human allegiances in the light of supreme allegiance 
to God, and demands that the Christian only exercise the freedom 
which affirms and points to the freedom of God. It does not mean 
that Christians will not have human allegiances nor claim human 
freedoms, but rather that the allegiances chosen and the freedoms 
claimed must reflect participation in the revolution of God, from 
which authority and freedom derive their being. The revolution of 
God therefore prevents human authority from becoming tyranny and 
human freedom from becoming chaos. 
The issue of the oath also provides an insight into Barth's 
character. He was placed under enormous pressure by the state, 
the university and some of his colleagues, including Rudolf 
Bultmann, to submit himself to the oath. The only support he 
received was from a group of his students who composed the rhyme: 
Karl, we know, is hardly vile 
and yet he has to go on trial. 21 
Despite the attempted coercion Barth resolutely stood his ground. 
His understanding of Jesus Christ, demanded faithfulness which 
did not consider human cost, but asserted the sov,reignty of God. 
He did not look to the left or the right for support or 
justification, for God alone justifies or condemns. He proceeded, 
as a lonely individual in a crowd, to be true to his faith. Yet, 
as indicated above, the God in whose name Barth refused to make 
18 
the oath is not removed from human community. On the contrary, 
this refusal proclaimed God's negation of all that denies true 
human community, and affirmed the human search for a state which 
more closely corresponds to the justice of the kingdom of God. 
Such complete commitment married to Barth's deep understanding of 
community and co-humanity indicates that God's revolution 
creatively exposes the inseparability of the individual from the 
community, and the community from the individual. The limits and 
possibilities of human freedom are always realised in community. 
1.4 EAST AND WEST AND GOD'S PERMANENT REVOLUTION. 
The East-West conflict continues to have currency nearly forty 
years after the intense criticism of Barth's position on the 
inclusion of Hungary into the Eastern bloc. Barth did not regard 
it the most urgent priority to expose the dangers communism held 
for the church and theology. He rather chose to enter into the 
debate under the rubric "The Christian Community in the Midst of 
Political Change". He suggested that the Hungarian church should 
neither set itself up in principled opposition to or support for 
nor retreat into an apolitical neutrality. It 
should instead be "so independent •.. and so sympathetic that it 
1s able to summon the representatives of the old and new order 
alike .•• to humility, to the praise of God and to humanity, and 
can invite them all to trust in the great change (in the death 
and resurrection of Christ) and to hope in his revelatian''. 22 The 
task of the Hung,arian church was to accept respcinsibility few the 
state by pointing the representatives of the new order to the 
origin and source of all true change - the death and resurrection 
19 
of Jesus Christ. In other words Barth called them ta proclaim the 
revolution of God as the foundation of all human transformation, 
in the interests of ensuring that the new political dispensation 
actually made a qualitative difference to the society. 
A barrage of criticism followed. Reinhold Niebuhr accused Barth'$ 
theology of being too transcendent and, theref.ore, incapablt': of 
reason+?d politi<:al judgements; 2 ~ Herberg charged him 
"despicable neutralism" and "indifference to 
actual i ti i?s·"; 24 West contended that a primary emphasis on grace 
tended to neglect social analysis, whilst Brunner "publically 
asked Barth why he did not 'issue a call to oppose communism and 
make a christian confession' as he had done against National 
Socialism".:..its Ncitably ,all Barth's critics were from the We1st .• :.;u,, 
Although Barth remained a socialist, his praxis with regard to 
Hungary reflects more than his consistent commitment to 
socialism. It also reveals something of his understanding of the 
revolution of God. The assumption of Barth's critics was that the 
logical alternative to communism was the 'christian West'. They 
Barth to enter Hungary supportive of 
chr i stemdom. In Barth's analysis this would be more problematic 
than a provisional acceptance of communist rule. Barth n<ei t.:her 
inclined towards Eastern communism nor towards Western anti-.. 
communism but in the final analysis he regarded ''anticommunism as 
a matt.er of pri nci pl e an evi 1 greate1r than <:ommuni sm". :;;~ 7 He 
simply believed that a provisional acceptance of communist rule 
provided a better human context for participation in the 
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perpetual revolution of God than the Western alternative. Neither 
al ter·nat i ves could be regarded as the final word. :Barth 
recognised the negation of the revolution of God in the 
identification of Western culture and lifestyles with the 
Christian gospel. His praxis in Hungary was thus more ~ 
resounding No to the West than a Yes to the East. The task of the 
theologian in this context was, in Barth's mind, proclaim divine 
justification as the basis of human life and, therefore, justice 
as the foundation of the true state. It was the situation that 
determined the form this proclamation should take. It was not 
Barth's theology or mind that had radically changed, it wa1s 
simply being applied differently to another conte>: t.. The 
influence of Barth's own context in this regard must not be 
under-estimated. Lehmann shows how Barth saw his task as 
"proclaiming justice as the love of God in action" and r,ot 
providing for the self-justification of prevailing structures of 
power in his Western context. Barth's silence on Hungary was 
deliberately and prophetically chosen in the light of this task: 
It is very much to the point and required of Christian faith 
and obedience to alert those who live under the 
dehumanisation of capitalism and who seek to justify 
themselves by anti-communist fanaticism that - since the 
compound injustice with hypocrisy - they are the worst case. 
The mote and the beam, the serpent and the dove, the sheep 
and the goats have never been more perceptively and 
politically conjoined with the poetry and politics of the 
Old Testament prophets, nor more faithfully applied than by 
Barth's deliberately chosen silence on Hungary. 28 
In this regard the depth of social analysis in Barth's response 
on this occasion is the cornerstone of his prophetic insights. 
Only with profound understanding of human reality could Barth 
have perceived in 1948 what is much clearer to ug new. The 
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different conclusions reached by Barth and his adversaries 
illustrates the decisive role played by ideological commitment in 
theological debate. Barth's predisposition toward socialism was 
bound to give rise to conclusions conflicting with those arising 
from a commitment to capitalism. The real question is which 
ideological commitment bears greater analogy to the 
eschatolagical kingdom of God. There is a continuity and 
discontinuity between the praxis of human beings and the praxis 
of God. Barth's praxis implies that the continuity is at least as 
significant as the discontinuity. He passionately held to the 
infinite qualitative distinction, but he consistently, after 
analysis, chose the best human option. 
1.5 TOWARD THE REVOLUTION OF GOD. 
In summation, these glimpses at Barth reveal some pertinent 
directions for theology. 
Firstly, theology only becomes liberating memory when it is 
grounded in corresponding praxis. Moments of the intrusion of 
God's 1race into human experience do not occur theoretically. One 
may well question whether Barth's theology would have had any 
impact at all apart from his commitment to social and political 
engagement. Theology is truly a journey from praxis to theory and 
back to praxis. The revolution of God must find parabcli2 human 
form or we have not yet done theology. 
Secondly, the content of the revolution of God remains the grace 
of God but the context of human action determines the form God's 
revolution will take in praxis. In every new situation a return 
to reflection on the grace of God calls into question all the 
previous shapes humanity has atttempted to give to the revolution 
of God. Barth's creative freedom in being able to bring new and 
revolutionary theological insights into different situations is 
testimony to this. This is indeed a window into the freedom of 
God. Theology is thus theologia viatorum net because its content 
alters but because it finds new form as the context alters. The 
revolution of God provides the content and th- human context, the 
form of human praxis. 
Further, this biographical analysis of Barth's theology 
demonstrates the validity of deeper penetration into Barth's 
thought in order to mare fully understand the revolution of God. 
Nonetheless, the praxis that forms the background to the theology 
analysed in the proceeding chapters is fundamental to 
understanding that theology. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT. 
The first chapter justified the need to investigate the concept 
of the revolution of God in the theology of Karl Barth as a basis 
for identifying the intention of his theology, which is to 
transform (or revolutionise) the kingdoms of this world into the 
kingdom of God. 
The phrase 'revolution cf God' itself occurs infrequently in the 
writings of Karl Barth. This is not surprising because Barth 
increasingly saw his task theologically and therefore, used 
theological and religious-metaphorical language rath~r than 
explicitly political terms. This does not mean that Barth 
distanced himself from politics. Rather, as the previous chapter 
indicates, he consistently maintained that theology provides the 
proper foundation for politics. In his earlier writings Barth 
showed a willingness to use the political terminology of 
revolution, and his reluctance to use similar language in Church 
Dogmatics does not mean that the essence of the concept no longer 
applied. The purpose of this chapter is to give some content to 
the hypothesis that the concept of the revolution of God, despite 
the lack of explicit terminology, provides a comprehensive 
paradigm fer the whole of Barth's theology. 
This is done by exploring the development of the concept in 
Barth's earlier writings, setting the scene for an examination of 
the key concepts of the revolution of God in his mature theology. 
In so doing a hermeneutical key is identified that unlocks the 
radical dimensions of the Barthian perspective, and rescues his 
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theology from conservative misappropriation. 
The development of the concept of the revolution of God finds its 
context within Barth's quest for an acceptable theological basis 
r.md political pra>:is. Barth's theological fo1~ social 
occ:up-ation not with understanding re .. 'l.l i ty but 
pr·e-
with 
transforming it. The question is: does he provide us with a 
theological approach that enables the transformation of reality? 
Before addressing that question it is necessary in this chapter 
to trace the development of his theology from the perspective of 
the concept of the revolution of God. Whilst the task of the 
early part of this chapter partially overlaps with the second 
biographical cameo of chapter one, the focus is sharpened. The 
question now relates to the actual content of the concept of the 
revolution of God as it developed. 
restricted to essential factors. 
2.1 THE PHASES OF BARTH'S LIFE. 
Repetition will, howt.~ver, be 
In order to properly locate the discussion of the development of 
the concept of the revolution of God it is necessary to briefly 
outline the phases of Barth's life. 
oversimplification and reductionism, 
Whilst such phases tend to 
for the sake of analysis it 
is useful to make approximate distinctions. Barth's theological 
devf.?l c1pment is usually traced through specific periods of his 
life which can be summarised as follows: 1 (i) His student years 
during which he was schooled in nineteenth century theology under 
teachers such as Adolf Harnack and Wilhelm Herrmann. 2 (ii) The 
Geneva and Safenwil experiences plunged the young pastor into the 
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dynamics of worker and trade union relations, flli:.':\kinq csn 
impression that would last throughout his life. It was during his 
sojourn at Safenwil that Barth became aware of the limitations of 
both liberal theology and religious-socialism. This per-i od 
culminated in the publication of the first edition of Romerbrief 
in 1. 91 <:;>, which, because of its contemporary ring and radical 
position created a theological sensation.~ <iii) This instituted 
the period experienced by Barth as Zwischen den Zeiten, d1.w i ng 
which he served as professor of theology at Gottingen and 
Munster. This period provided Barth with the opportunity to 
consolidate his theological foundations in preparation for his 
r-adical politi1:al struggle agc:d nst Hitler and National 
Sociali&m. 4 The conclusion of this phase is associated with the 
publication of the second edition of Anselm: Fides Quaerens 
Intellectum, which Bar-th later- descr-ibed as his most satisfying 
work.~ The beginning of the writing of Bar-th's matur-e theology 
in his opus magnum, Church Dogmatics, and his most radical 
politics evident in his par-ticipation in the chur-ch struggle in 
Germany char-acterises the next phase.• This and the subsequent 
per-iods of Barth's life are considered in Chapter Four. In this 
chapter-, with these periods of Barth's life as a framework, the 
development of the concept of the ..-evolution of God in the time 
leading up to Anselm is analysed. 
It is impor-tant to note that Fr-ederich-Wilhelm Marquar-dt, in his 
Theologie und Sozialismus, examine~ the concept of the ..-evolution 
of God in relation to his thesis concer-ning Bar-th's socialism.• 
He points out that Barth's understanding of the revolution of God 
I 
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should not merely be seen as an alternative to the Leninist 
revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, but 
radicalisation thereof. 7 The purpose of this thesis is, on the 
other hand, more specific. It is to examine the theological 
concept of God's revolution itself and its development as a 
t~eological formulation. 
2.2 BEYOND LIBERALISM AND RELIGIOUS-SOCIALISM. 
An examination of Barth's perspective while pastor at Geneva and 
Safenwil reveals one who is at once a product of his liberal 
teachers and a herald of a new kind of theology. In the address 
to the Labour Unions of Safenwil in 1911 Barth sought to make a 
direct connection between the goals of the kingdom of God and the 
goals of socialism, between Jesus Christ and the ''movement for 
social justice''. 9 The theory was neither completely undialectic 
nor completely dialectic. A synthesis between God and humanity 
could exist at the level of goals and limits (theory> whilst at 
the level of strategies (praxis) an antithesis prevailed. On the 
matter of socialism, humanity and God coincided in theory but 
digressed in praxis. At this stage of his theology God could be 
clearly and directly identified with a human option. God's 
revolution and human revolutions had similar goals but different 
methods. 
Four important factors emerge from this early period: 
Firstly, the presupposition behind Barth's whole theological 
endeavour, even at this stage, was to ground his social and 
political praxis in an adequate theological base. 
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Secondly, although Barth drew somewhat definite lines between 
human and divine in theory, he demonstrated that he was openly 
critical of t.he w,:1.y in which socialists of that 
applying that theory: 
When I talk about the movement for social justice, I am not 
talking about what some or all Social Democrats are doing; I 
am talking about what they Nant. 9 
time were 
Consequently, Jesus was not simply a socialist: ".Jesus is more 
socialist than the socialist!;;". 10 In this theological criticism 
of socialism from the left Barth was, in a rudimentary way, 
beginning to see socialism (and human revolution} from the 
perspective of Jesus rather than Jesus from the perspective of 
socialism. Jesus was already the criterion for Bar-·th 's social 
pra:1 is al though, at this stage, he (Barth) was ~Jite undialectic 
about the relationship between Jesus and human action. There was 
an "inner ccmnect ion that exists beti-Jeen what is eternal, 
permanent, and general in modern social democracy (socialism) and 
the eternal Word of God, which in Jesus became flesh". 11 This 
implied an organic connection between the kingdom of God and the 
praxis of humans which was to become increasingly problematic for 
a sound theological basis for social Nonetheless, the 
major thrust of this early theology was a radical questioning of 
capitalism, but the corollary was that current forms of socialism 
were also inadequate. Nonetheless, the salvation of both 
christianity and sc>c i a 1 i sm l a y in their being seen as 
inextricably bound to one another: 
Real socialism is r-eal christianity in our time.' 2 
,Jesus "opposed t.hi~t. material misery that ought not to be" and 
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insti.llt?d in peClplt? the Spirit that 11 tr,:1nsforms matter". 1 '3 This 
was essentially a revolutionary theCllogy which, in Marxian terms, 
sought to overthrew of existing relations of production. Yet 
alt.hough Barth's theology was already revolutionary, it. vJas not 
yet grounded in the revolution of God alone. The idealistic 
confidence in human ability implicit in both nineteenth century 
liberal theology and religious-socialism still 
Barth's theology. 
Thirdly, Barth conceived of the relationship between God and 
humanity as reversible. There was both a movement from God to 
humanity and a reciprocal reverse movement. He could hold to the 
twin phrases: "Jesus i:;; the mov+?ment ·for social j1.1sti ce, and thf.:? 
movement for social justice is Jesus, in the present". 14 The 
point he was making was clear: pastoral and socialist praxis were 
integrally related. However this approach tended to make God so 
imminent that God's transcendence was compromised, thus falling 
foul of Feuerbach's charge of anthropomorphism. This was the 
approach of the religious-socialists which ultimately proved 
inadequate for Barth. The seeds of Barth's impending break with 
religious-socialism were sown. 
Fourthly, the major pre-occupation of Barth's theology became the 
relationship between faith and history. This is evident in his 
more comprehensive approach to the doctrine of God in an essay 
entitled "Faith in a personal God" published in 1914. u 5 Hen2 he 
developed a twofold thesis: 
transcendence is absolute. 
God's presence is personal and God's 
These theses seemed to posit an 
irreconcilable juxtaposition between God as absolute and thus 
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abstract, and God as personal and thus anthropomorphically 
limited. Barth sought to reconcile the dilemma by grounding the 
' 
religious experience of the personal God in concrete reality and 
insisting on the primacy of praxis: 
Experience, praxis or whatever one wants to call it, is the 
obvious presupposition, the source of all religious 
utterances. 16 
In this way Barth sought to reconcile Schleiermacher's theology 
of immediate experience with the new influence of the religious-
socialists, all within the framework of liberal theology. However 
tentatively, this heralded the beginning of a new search for the 
relationship between faith and history beyond th~ idealism and 
relativism of liberal theology. Barth would ultimately have to 
conclude that the relativistic presuppositions and method of 
liberal theology provided no adequate counter to the critique of 
Feuerbach, nor a sound foundation from which to talk about the 
real subject of theological discourse - the sovereignty of God. 
All liberal theology, when speaking of God ~ollapsed into 
immanent synthesis or abstract transcendence. The basi~ criterion 
sought by Barth, namely, a concept of the sovereignty of God that 
included both the transcendence of God in Godself and the 
immanence of God for humanity, had not been found. As a result of 
of liberal theology's faith-history synthesis, human revolution 
and praxis had become too direct a reflection of the revolution 
of God. With this background the relationship between faith and 
history, theory and praxis, God's revolution and human revolution 
became the primary pre-occupation of Barth's theology from this 
time. 17 
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Increasingly, Barth came to see the relationship between theology 
and human praxis (particularly politics) as that between the 
absolute and the relative. Political formulations were not the 
II ideal i sat i cm elf compromises and concessions II in a relative 
world, but "provisional and i mperfe.'c:t. n:al i sat ions II of the 
absolute. 18 The former approach implied idealistic complacency 
whilst the latter signalled permanent discontent with human 
formulations, and demanded a continued search for better 
realisations of the absolute. Nowhere is this clearer than in 
Barth's critique of Friedrich Naumann, a prominent German 
political liberal: 
It is one thing to live in the world of relativities and to 
become completely satisfied with aesthetic good pleasure at 
how wonderful it all is, and quite another to live in a 
world of relativities with a constant disquiet and longing 
<Sehnsucht) for something better which is to come, for the 
absolute goal of a humane social life beyond all temporal 
necessities.,., 
This anticipates what was to become a fully fledged permanent 
revolution of God against all human options in more mature 
Barthian theology. The proposal was to take the absolute 
sovereign and transcendent God with the utmost political 
seriousness. Only the political consequences of the sovereignty 
of God could provide an adequate basis for revolutionary social 
pra>(is. It is interesting to note that the permanent discontent 
with all human formulations of the absolute would later be 
equally applied to theological statements and ecclesiastical 
structures. 
Barth's theological suspicions about the inadequacy of the 
liberal framework for theology were merely confirmed when, in 
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the incident discussed in chapter one, his liberal teachers 
endorsed the war policy of Kaiser Wilhelm 11.20 His 
epistemological and methodological break with liberalism had 
already begun. 
Of contemporary note is the continuity and discontinuity between 
the emergence of Barth's theology and the more recent emergence 
of liberation theology. In short, both rediscovered the primacy 
of praxis; both defined theology as reflection on concrete human 
activity; both saw the need for a theological basis for 
revolutionary politics. However they were to follow divergent 
paths from their discovery. Barth set out to reformulate theology 
emphasising the unity and sovereignty of God against all human 
options, whilst the liberation theologians emp~asise social 
analysis in the search for the most realistic human options for 
the liberation of the oppressed. 21 Whilst a full explication of 
this theme is beyond the scope of this thesis, the questions 
raised by this evaluation will receive greater attention in the 
fifth chapter. 
2.3 CLEARING THINGS AWAY. 
An older Barth in reflecting upon the period after his break from 
liberal theological methodology and religious-socialism had this 
to say: 
I 
How we cleared things away! And we did almost nothing but 
clear away. Everything which even remotely smacked of 
mysticism and morality, of pietism and romanticism, or even 
of idealism, was suspected and sharply interdicted or 
bracketed with reservations which sounded actually 
prohibitive! What should really have been only a sad 
friendly smile was a derisive laugh. 22 
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Having theologically come up against the stone wall cif God's 
sovereignty, and politically disillusioned by religious socialist 
praxis, a new theological approach was indicated. This was 
primarily initiated in the first edition of the Epistle to the 
Romans (hereafter Romans) and the Tambach lecture, both in 1919. 
2.2.1 The Radicalisation of Revolution. 
Under the influence of Kierkegaard and Blumhardt, amongst others, 
Barth developed his theology with the presupposition of the 
infinite qualitative distinction between God and humanity, heaven 
and earth. His theological pre-occupation was that only the 
assertion of God as God provides for a revolutionary theology 
worthy of God •. In this period Barth developed the concept of God 
as "wholly other", which was the relativising i::1nd c:crient.ing 
framework for all human activity: 
God's sovereignty alone becomes the concrete ground, limit 
and orientation of all human thought and action. 23 
The first edition of Romans still contained traces of the 
reversible, organic relationship between God's kingdom and human 
activity. Barth could say, on the one hand, that politic.al 
strategies can receive no direct theological sanction: 
Yet, 




chaplain ••• ; 
socialist. 24 
strike, general strike, and street fighting if 
be, but no religious justification or 
of it ... ; military service as soldier or 
it must be, but on no condition as military 
social democratic but not religious 
on the other hand, he could look forward to the time when, 
through human participation in the ''absolute revolution that 
comes fr-om God", a new socialist world and socialist church 
founded on Marxist dogma would emerge. 2 ~ This implied that there 
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w,:-:\s still an organic relationship between a particular human 
programme and the eschatological kingdom of God. Although human 
revolution and God's revolution were dialectically related, an 
historical synthesis of the two was organically 2onceivable. 
Barth had not yet found a completely adequate theological 
formulation that circumvented the pitfalls of liberalism and 
religious-socialism. 
Ta•bach 
The Tambach lecture on "The Christian's Place in Society" 
represented another milestone in the development of the concept 
of the revolution of God. 2 b Here the No of God to all human 
activity received greater emphasis. This lecture contained the 
first reasonably well-developed exposition of the concept of 
God's revolution. The revolution of God is described in Hegelian 
dialectic language and perceived as a movF.?ment "from above": 
A movement from a third dimension, so to speak, which 
transcends and yet penetrates all these (humin •• ASB) 
movements and gives them their inner meaning and motive; a 
movement which has neither its origin nor its aim in space, 
in time nor in the contingency of things ••• 27 
This movement is manifested in Jesus Christ, who is the 
"absolut-ely r,et\J -from ab<.>~··e", the antithesis to all that is human 
and relative. 28 This antithesis is rooted in the Kingdom of God 
which is the original and final synthesis, "the n:~voluticin which 
is bE~·forf,? all revolutii::ins". 29 It ii;; only fr··om the per-spective of 
the antithesis which derives strength from the synthesis that the 
human condition (the thesis) aquires significance: 
Only from the 
roots in the 
calmly. 30 
standpoint of an antithesis which has 





Jesus, as antithesis, is the negation, the divine No to all human 
activity and revolution, and the consistent reminder thaf 
everything has its origin and destination in God as the original 
synthesis. This does not, however, mean the paralysis of all 
human action. All human activity receives its grounding and 
o~ientation from the antithesis, Jesus Christ. 
Nonetheless, an inconsistency remains in the relationship Barth 
posits between the divine and the human. Two approaches to the 
relationship between human activity and divine reality are 
evident. On the one hand he described the human movements of 
protest as an ''integral moment in the kingdom of God''; 31 whilst 
on the other Barth sought to relate relate divine and human 
activity in terms of analogy: 
And even more clearly brought out in Jesus is the fact that 
the transitory is only a parable. His very unconcern for the 
things and events he relates makes it quite clear that he 
sought their original and creative element and not the mere 
things and events themselves, but in their idea, their 
heavenly analogue. 32 
and again: 
Our little Nithin belongs to the realm of analogies, and it 
is from beyond that realm that we draw our life. There is no 
continuity leading from analogy over to divine reality. 33 
The former approach tends to maintain the organic link between 
the heaven and earth, divine and human revolutions; whilst the 
latter provides the foundation of a more dialectic approach in 
which God and humanity can only be indirectly related. It is also 
pertinent that at this early stage in Barth's theology the 
concept of analogy was evident as the mediatory link between the 
revolution of God and human revolution. Through the concept cf 
analogy Barth was able to begin to formulate a revolutionary 
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theology that found its source and centre in God's transcendence, 
whilst at the same time providing a basis <not a baptism) for 
human movements of protest. Analogy provided a way of indirectly 
relating God's revolution and human praxis, which simultaneously 
de-absolutised human action and gave it foundation. 
The purpose was not to discourage human resistance but to 
radicalise praxis on the basis of the revolution of God~ In this 
sense Marquardt is correct in concluding that the "revolution of 
God radicalises the function of the Leninist dictatorship of the 
proletariat".::.'!14 Only c\ recogniticm of the potential o-f the 
"world as it is" to bear no more than analogous witness to the 
kingdom of Gc:>d, as the original synthesis, provides a 
sufficiently radical grounding for human revolution: 
Only out of 
radical denial 
such an affirmation can come that 
which is manifestly the meaning 
movements of protest. 3 ~ 
genuine, 
of our 
The concept of analogy is central to the mature Barthian 
understanding of the revolution of God and is more fully 
discussed in chapters three and four below. 
Also of significance was Barth's definition of the revolution of 
God as the "new from above" because this emphasis continued to 
find prominence throughout his theological project, and is 
centr-,:.~l to the concept of God's revolution. The perception was 
that the qualitative transformation of human existence was only 
possible from without, in Godself. In short, only God was truly 
revel Lit i onary. 
38 
The Second Edition of Romans 
When the second edition of Romans appe~red the break with the 
1 :i beral past was complete. 36 No traces of the former organic 
connection between the human and divine realms remained. Further, 
by this time the inadequacies of the October revolution in Russia 
were becoming apparent and, consequently,this edition of f.:omans 
reflected a greater suspicion of human revolution. This suspicion 
necessitated a greater emphasis on the divine r~gation of the 
hubris evident in all human activity. Nothing on earth could be 
organically related to heaven. Barth described his method as 
follows: 
.•. if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of 
what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative 
distinction' between time and eternity, and to my regarding 
this as possessing both negative and positive significance: 
'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth', The relation 
between such a God and such a man, and the relation between 
such a man and such a God, is for me the theme of the 
Bible and the essence of philosophy, 37 
Following this system Barth developed a theological basis for 
human praxis grounded in the revolution that comes from God 
alone. At this stage the source of revolution of God was found, 
as before, in the grace revealed in the person of Jesus Christ 
and its indirect relation to humanity in the great positive 
possibility of loving one another. The emphasis was, however, 
di-f·ferent. 
Here Barth tackles the problem of revolution head on in 
ccmsi deri ng the role of revolution under the "gr-eat negative 
possi bi l :i. ty" of submission to the state. 30 Marquardt aptly 
summarises the difference between the fir-st and second editions 
of Romerbrief in asserting that in the former edition God is 
viewed from the perspective of revolution, whereas in the latter 
revolution is viewed from the perspective of God. 39 
In the second edition Barth criticises human revolution from an 
almost anarchistic perspective, insisting that revolutionaries 
are inevitably overcome by the illusion of believing that in the 
face of the 'old' they could represent the 'new'. Ultimately, the 
revolutionary tends to give new form to the old evil of existing 
government. He asks the pertinent questions: 
Is there anywhere legality that 
illegal? Is there anywhere authority 
based upon tyranny? 4 o 
is not fundamentally 
which is not ultimately 
It is in the answer to these rhetorical questions that the real 
birth.of revolution lies: 
From this perception of the evil that lies in the very 
existence of the existing government, Revolution is born. 41 
Hence, Barth's criticism of the current revolutionary praxis 
rested not so much in t~e wrongness of revolution per se~ but in 
the failure of human revolution to be radical enough in bringing 
about a new order. The revolutionary "stands so strangely near to 
God" and 11 150 much nearer the truth" and is in perpetual danger of 
trying to do what God alone can do. 42 The revolutionary begins by 
aiming at the "impossible possibility" of the true Revolution of" 
love and forgiveness, but ends up choosing the "possible 
possibility" of revolutionary discontent and hatred. 43 Only God 
can be truly revolutionary, only God is capable of bringing the 
necessary transformation from the outside. Barth's comments on 
the reference to the power in Romans 13:2 is apposite: 
There is a precedent judgement, not for the existing order, 
but against revolution. This judgement is based upon the 
fact that the real revolution comes from God and not human 
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revolt. To the revolutionary, the power represents the 
sovereign right of the divine Revolution. 44 
Because it is God alone who pronounces a sufficiently radical No 
to the power of existing authorities, all revolution that is 
independent of this No is actually rebellion against God. The 
judgement upon human authority originates in God and therefore 
r-eal revolution comes from God alone~ and humanity can only 
witness to this judgement. Further this implies a permanent 
revolution in which God consistently negates all human rebellion 
and human structures, which inevitably contain the seeds of their 
own dissolution. At this stage a heavy emphasis upon the No of 
God to all human activity was in danger of eclipsing a somewhat 
less distinct Yes. 
This Yes was located in the possibility of a revolutionary praxis 
v1hich gains its gr-Dunding and orientation in the "great positive 
possibility of love". Only on the basis of this love could human 
participation in the revolution of God be transformed into 
positive action which testifies to a qualitatively new r-ealitys 
We define love as the 'Great POSITIVE Possibility', because 
in it there is brought to light the revolutionary aspect of 
all ethical behaviour, and because it is veritably concerned 
with the denial and breaking up of the existing order ••• In 
as much as we love one another we cannot wish to uphold the 
present order as such, for by love we do the 'ne~· by which 
the 'old' is overthrown. 4 e 
This meant that although no temporal synthesis could be conceived 
between the kingdom of God and human kingdoms, humanity could 
participate in the revolution of God by transforming and limiting 
human revolution with the pDsitive possibility of love. 
· Par-·ticipatim1 in this love rescues human revolution ·from 
being overcome by the evil present in the existence of human 
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government. Love enables the transformation of the established 
order by something new 'from above' whi c:11 ensurt7S that revolution 
does not merely become the source of its own undoing, but 
actually contributes to the creation of a more just human order. 
In Romans this love is grounded in the knowledge of God revealed 
in the person of Jesus Christ. It is only when human beings have 
stood before God and been touched by God's freedom that they can 
recognise in every human neighbour the otherness of Jesus Christ. 
Love consequently operates independently of the one being loved, 
and is able to love all human beings freely without preference: 
Love, being altogether independent of its object - the 
concrete 'neighbour'! - is, for that very reason, altogether 
bound to it. Love beholds in every concrete neighbour only 
the parable of him who is to be loved; but nevertheless it 
does really see, it really does see in every temporal 'Thou' 
the eternal, contrasted 'Thou' apart from whom there is no 
'I', Love, therefore, is love of men, of concrete, 
particular men; and it is this precisely because it has no 
preference for any particular man ••• Love is 'eternal, 
levelling righteousness' (Kierkegaard), because it justifies 
no man according to his desire. 46 
This relationship of love is therefore not merely the 
confrontation of one human being with another, "but God who 
confronts God" 47 , and is, therefore, a revolution in and of God 
alone. It is a revolution humanity can never own, ,::\nd y<~t:, 
because of the grace of God, humans are elected to share in it, 
thus making an impossible possibility possible. Dnl y thi =• 
revolution is radical enough because it deals not only with the 
inadequacy of human structure but also with the root of all human 
disorder - the human incapacity for love. 
Lehmann, commenting on Barth, has shown how love alone can 
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preserve revolution from its own destruction, love alone is able 
to ensure that revolution consistently remains humanising. 
Furthermore it is only this love, namely, the love in which God 
confronts God, that is able to guarantee humanisation. 
Love exalts the humanity of the neighbour above the cause 
that proclaims its advent, and transfigures the passion of 
revolution so that its promises may in truth be born. 49 
2.4 EMERGING QUESTIONS. 
Because a more comprehensive evaluation of love in relation to 
the revolution of God will follow it will suffice to raise two 
questions at this stage. 
The first question concerns the theory of the revolution of God, 
whilst the second raises the relationship between God's 
revolution and human praxis. 
Firstly, the theological adequacy of_ the foundations of the 
revolution of God must be tested. If God's revolution is to 
provide an adequate theological base for revolutionary praxis, 
then how does God in Jesus Christ enable communication between 
God and humanity across the infinite qualitative distinction? A 
deeper ancilliary question here is: How do we understand God in 
such a way that the critique of Feuerbach is overcome? This 
relates to Barth's search for a theology which includes both an 
understanding of God as God exists in Godself and God as God acts 
~or humanity. Up to now Barth's epistemology was essentially 
theocratic in contrast to his later exclusively christocratic 
theology. Whereas, at this stage Barth conceived of Jesus only as 
the antithesis, later he would emphasise the twofold nature of 
Jesus as the immanent theological foundation of the antithe~is, 
original and final synthesis, and the thesis. In Jesus alone 
God's revolution is revealed. Because of the earlier stress on 
the No of God Barth tended to attribute to Jesus the primary role 
of negation. However, as his theology developed Jesus was seen as 
primarily embodying the affirmative Yes of God which includes the 
No. Before, the No of God's revolution was located 
christologically and the Yes was found in a theocratic concept of 
the kingdom of God. Later, Jesus became the only source for 
understanding both the Yes and the No of God's revolution as well 
as the basis for understanding true humanity. 
In this way the three elements of Tambach 
(humanity>, the antithesis (Jesus) and the original 
the thesis 
and final 
synthesis (the kingdom of God), all co-incide in a Chalcedonian 
christology. This christology provided Barth with a way of 
formulating the revolution of God which affirms both God in 
Godself and proclaims God's act for humanity. In short, whilst 
Jesus was once included in the revolution of God, he is later 
seen as embodying the whole revolution within himself. 
developed in the fourth chapter. 
This is 
Secondly, we must explore the ethical content of love and the 
relationship of that content to the theological foundations 
implicit in the first question. If the theological concept of the 
revolution of God is to provide impetus and orientation for human 
revolution then what is the nature of the concrete ethical 
activities consistent with love? In other words what does it mean 
to love one another in practical realisable terms? 
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Barth's search for answers to these questions led him into the 
realm of dialectic thinking. This period extended from the 
writing of the second edition of Romans until the publication of 
Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum in 1929. During this phase all 
traces of undialectic thinking were systematically removed, 
causing Barth himself to raise questions in later reflection on 
this period: 
What if the result of the new hymn of praise to the majesty 
of God should be a new confirmation of the hopelessness of 
all human activity?4• 
This was certainly not his intention, but in the heat of the 
prophetic moment, might he have overstated his case? Had Barth 
given such prominence to the revolution that comes from God that 
human revolution paled into insignificant paralysis? Had human 
activity been so thoroughly de-absolutised that human beings were 
historically helpless? Barth himself raises a similar question in 
reflecting upon this period: 
Was the impression of many contemporaries wholly unfounded, 
who felt that the final result be to stand Schleiermacher on 
his head, that is, to make God great for a change at the 
cost of 1an? Were they wrong in thinking that actually not 
too much had been won and that in the final analysis it was 
only a new Titanism at work?e 0 
In terms of the question we have raised above: H~d Barth not 
become so pre-occupied with the theory of God's revolution that 
human praxis, whilst remaining a theoretical possibility, was 
virtually impossible? Had transcendence been emphasised and 
immanence paralysed? Was the No of God so loud that the yes of 
God was bearly audible? 
Whilst these questions must be considered it must also be asked: 
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' Does such prophetic and revolutionary theology does not, by 
nature, communicate its message with broad sweeping strokes that 
may later appear to be overstatement? Is this not necessary in 
the iconoclastic process of destroying the old and bringing in 
the n~w? Would Barth have been able to pursue his theological 
task in the same way if he had not first ruthlessly cleared the 
theological deck? Looking back it is difficult to conceive of how 
Barth could have reached his later position without this prior 
de-absolutising period. Indeed, things had to be cleared away to 
provide the context for a more integrated approach. 
Nonetheless, we must also recognise that t~e seed of a more 
positive theology which acknowledged both the No and the Yes of 
God was already evident. As early as 1922, when talking to a 
ministers about "The Need of Chr·ist:ian Preachin<;}'', Barth insisted 
that the No of God is also the Yes: 
The person who says that the Bible leads us to where finally 
we hear only a great No or see a great void, proves only 
that he has not yet been led thither. This No is really Yes. 
This judgement is grace. This condemnation is forgiveness. 
This death is life. This hell is heaven. This fearful God is 
a loving father who takes the prodigal in his arms. The 
crucified is the one raised from the dead.s 1 
This indicates the purpose of Barth's turn to dialectic thinking 
not as the negation of human praxis in favour of God's 
revoluticm, but the de-absolutising of human formulations and 
act.ions, in order to introduce the necessary humility without 
falling into the despair of relativity. On another occasion in 
1.9'.22, under the title "The Word of God and the Task o·f the 
Barth clarified the need for dialectic methodology. 
Having posited ,the perplexity of the task of ministry as the 
46 
dilemma of being obliged to speak of God whilst being unable to 
do so, he suggested that dialectic theology provided a way ahead 
which, rather than denying the validity of human actions and 
formulations about God, placed them in proper perspective: 
The genuine dialectician knows that this Center <God) cannot 
be apprehended or beheld, and he will not if he can help it 
allow himself to be drawn into giving direct information 
about it, knowing that all such information, whether it be 
positive or negative, is not really information, but always 
either dogma or self-criticism. On this narrow ridge of rock 
one can only walk: if he attempts to stand still, he will 
fall either to the right or to the left, but fall he must ••• 
Our task is to interpret the Yes and the No and the No by 
the Yes without delaying more than a moment in a fixed Yes 
or a fixed No.~2 
Barth's use of dialectics is bound to be misunderstood if it is 
not seen within the context of its purpose to provide an 
alternative to the idealistic and positivistic notions of human 
praxis evident in both liberal and religious-socialism. Its final 
goal was to lead the theologian up to the ''gate which can only be 
opened from withln 1•.e 3 All human formulations and praxis can do 
no more than bear testimony to what God has done in Godself and 
for humanity. The No and the Yes of God stand as the permanent 
revolution, the ''Archimedean point from which the soul, and with 
the soul, the society is moved''. 54 
Nonetheless, Barth ultimately considered the dialectic approach 
to be inadequate in providing a sound theological foundation for 
this Archimedean point because it implied such separation that 
the incarnation could become inconceivable. This could result in 
talk about God which was unrelated to human praxis. It was the 
study of Anselm that led Barth to find in an analogical 
epistemology, a more adequate basis from which to speak about God 
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and humanity in such a way that the being of God, God in Godself, 
was inseparable from the act of God, God for humanity. Because 
this methodology dominates the rest of Barth's theological 
project, it is necessary for it to form the starting point of the 
next chapter which will seek to interpret the epistemological 
foundations of the revolution of God. 
Finally, however, it may also be argued that it was in his early 
dialectic period, especially Romans and Tambach, that Barth's 
theology was most explicitly revolutionary and ~hat the theology 
that followed represented, in some measure, a withdrawal into a 
detached academic discipline. Certainly Barth did not ever 
restate his position as sharply or polemically as during this 
period. This does not mean, however, that Barth's theology was 
any less revolutionary. Rather because of his shift to a more 
metaphoric and theological language the revolutionary cutting 
edge of his theology was obscured to les6 discerning readers. 
Herein lies the genius and the problem of Church Dogmatics and 
the use of the analogia relationis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE REVOLUTION OF GOD. 
The previous chapter raised the questions confronting Barth in 
the search for an adequate theological basis for the revolution 
of God. In summary these are: How can we talk of God's revolution 
without denying humanity? On what epistemological basis is it 
possible to speak about God without making the incarnation 
inconceivable? What provides an acceptable theological basis for 
the Archimedean point which limits and orientates all human 
activity? The challenge was to find a way of ensuring the 
inseparability of God's being and God's act, God in Godself and 
God for humanity. The search was for a conceptualisation of God 
grounded outside of human necessity and yet not removed from the 
sphere of human experience. Hunsinger summarises the questions: 
Ever since 1915 Barth's problem had been this: If theology 
starts from the experience of faith and reflects on it 
(Schleiermacher>, then how does theology ever get beyond the 
subjectivism, relativism and anthropocentrism of this object 
of reflection (Feuerbach)? How can theology get beyond the 
subjectivity of faith to the objectivity of God as he is in 
himself and in his relationship to man? How can theology 
find a consistent basis for taking God rather than faith as 
the concrete reality from which theological concepts are 
derived? How can theory and praxis be consistently grounded, 
limited and oriented in terms of God' sovereignty alone? 1 
Dialectics had provided a way of founding the revolution of God 
outside of human imperatives, but the ·1oud No of dialectic 
negation allowed only a negative basis for human praxis. If God's 
revolution is the basis for all human theory and praxis then it 
had to be grounded in God alone but it must also provide a 
positive basis for human participation in that revolution. This 
demanded a concept of God which located the dialectic No within 
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the framework of the divine Yes to full human life. This quest 
led to the discovery of the epistemological foundation for God's 
being in Anselm's analogical method, and the discerning of the 
theological basis for the unity cf God's being and act in a re-
appropriation of the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two-fold nature 
of Chr-i st. The former is the subject of this chapter, the latter 
will be discussed in chapter four. The purpose of this chapter is 
to show that Barth's quest for a concept of God which neither 
identifies nor separates God and humanity culminates in his 
analysis of Anselm. Here Barth finds an acceptable positive 
epistemological basis upon which to talk of both God and humanity 
without deifying humanity? or portraying God anthropomorphically. 
It is this ccmcept of God that gives the revolution of God its 
most radical foundation. 
3.1 ANSELM AND THE BEING OF GOD. 
As indicated, the period from the second edition of Romans to 
Anselm:Fide.s Quaerens Intellectum was characterised by 
dialectic epistemology. Nr..lw, in Anselm Barth is able to find a 
way of talking about God which enables a positive relationship 
between God and humanity without emphasising God at the expense 
cf humanity or humanity at the expense cf God. 
This approach is rooted in Anselm's famous formulation of the 
concept of God: aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari pOS$it 
(something than which nothing greater can be thought). 2 With this 
concept Barth establishes the object of theology independent of, 
(but not in contradiction to) human faith, thus simultaneously 
answering Feuerbach, and providing a sufficiently revolutionary 
foundation for human existence and praxis. The formulation 
pr-ovi des at the same time for- the "infinite qualitative 
distinction" between God and humanity, and the positive 
possibility of human thinking and acting in r-elation to God. It 
is gives definition to the God who alone is revolutionar-y enough 
to be the ground, limit and orientation of h~man resistance. It 
was under the inspiration and limitation of this understanding of 
God that Barth participated in resistance to Hitler- and National 
Socialism. 
Consequently, the necessity of God can be understood as internal 
to Godself, rat.her than an external necessity in the faith 
consciousness of humanity. This concept of God is not "the 
hi9hest man has conceived" nor· is it the:~ "highest man could 
conceive", it is an object i.-Jhich is "something completely 
independent of whether men in actual fact conceive it or can 
conceive it''. This independence of God is affirmed in response to 
Feuerbach's charges of anthropomorphism levelled at liberal 
theology. God is by definition incomprehensible. Barth clarifies: 
It is so chosen that its actual co'nception, as well as the 
possibility of its conception, emerges as being dependent 
upon an essentially unexpressed condition. All that the 
formula says about this object is, as far as I can see, this 
one thing, this one negative: nothing greater than it can be 
imagined; nothing can be imagined that in any r~$pect 
whatsoever could or would outdo it; as soon as anyone 
conceives anything which in any res~~ct whatsoever is 
greater than it, in so far as it can be conceived at all 
then he has not yet beg~n to conceive it or has already 
ceased. 3 
This formuiRtion does not describe the nature of God, but merely 
establishes the concept of God and allows for the possibility of 
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better understanding that concept from another source, namely, 
revelation. It is revelation that establishes the connection 
between the name of God (ie. the concept of God) and the nature 
of God. Anselm's formulation secures the being of God in Godself, 
whilst revelation is God's free self-disclosure of God's being in 
God's act. The aseity or self-existence of God is assured on the 
one hand, whilst God's free self-revelation allows for the human 
understanding of God. Hence, the Anselmian concept of God 
actually presupposes the idea of divine revelation. 4 God can only 
be understood if God chooses to reveal Godself to humanity. This 
relationship between the being of God and the act of God in 
revelation is foundational to Barth's entire Dogmatics. 
Barth suggests that Anselm develops a single argument in which 
two levels are evident, firstly, the general and, secondly, the 
special existence of God.e God's general existence shows that 
God is not a figment of human though~, nor an idealisation of 
humanity, but a self-existent reality: 
God does not only exist in thought but also over and against 
thought. 6 
God's special existence refers not only to the existence of God 
in the sense that other things exist, but establishes the 
uniqueness of God in relation to all other existent things. God 
is not only ''one of the items in a complete inventory of the 
universe'', but the self-existent reality which forms the origin, 
basis and orientation of all that exists apart from God: 7 
God does not only exist in the manner of other existents 
(over against thinking, independent, in true objectivity). 
But God exists in the uniquely true manner that befits the 
Existent One who is at once the Origin and Basis of all 
reality behind the concept of existence.a 
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Such a definition of the existence of God establishe3 the 
principle that God, as aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit, 
cannot be derived or interpreted from any conception based in 
human experience. God is knowable only through the gracious act 
of self-revelation and remains incomprehensible apart from this 
act. 
It follows that only God is ontically rational and the source of 
all rationality, and rational knowledge and enquiry about God as 
the object of faith must be derived from the object itself and 
not from faith. With this God, which cannot be conceived not to 
exist, as the ontic basis and source of all knowledge, it is then 
possible to speak of a corresponding or analogous noetic 
knowledge resulting from a faith-encounter with the object of 
faith as God reveals Godself to humanity. Barth insists that this 
correspondence is in fact essential: 
Corresponding to the basis in faith there has to be a reason 
in knowledge; to the antic a corresponding noetic 
necessity. 9 
Faith in a rational being can do no other than lead to a search 
for the rational understanding of the object of faith. The human 
formulations about the object of faith derive both their 
necessity and rationality from the antic necessity and 
rationality of God. However, the 'knowledge' of which Barth 
speaks is grounded in the faith that is inspired by God's 
revelation. It is the knowledge of faith (intellectus fidei). 
The knowledge, the intellectus, with which Anselm is 
concerned is the intellectus fidei. This means that it can 
consist only of positive meditation on the object of faith. 
It cannot establish this object of faith as such but rather 
has to understand it in its very incomprehensibility. 10 
56 
Yet this faith is not irrational, because it finds its basis in 
God who is ultimate rationality. 
Anselm taught Barth that the process of 'provinq' God is 
fundamentally a problem of understanding and not of proof. 
Therefore, in noting that Anselm speaks of God whilst speaking to 
Gc>d, Barth insists that the believer is concerned to expound the 
"kn owl edge that:. is peC::Ltl i ar tr.:> f ,::d th, the knowledge of what is 
believed from what is believed''. 11 Hence, in order to verify talk 
about God it is necessary to first clarify it from the 
perspective of faith. The task of theology is therefore to enable 
faith to seek understanding: Fides quaerens intellectum. Whereas 
dialectic methodology insists on the impossibilty and crisis of 
all ~uman formulations about God; this new method demonstrates 
that a positive affirmative connection can be made between God's 
rationality and human reason, God's revolution and human 
revolution, faith and history. These seemingly exclusive 
conceptual pairs, although remaining qualitatively different, 
were now positively related to one another in an analogical 
relationship grounded in faith which seeks understanding. Herein 
lies the epistemological roots of the analogia relationis and the 
analogia fidei which, as will be more fully discussed in the 
ne>:t chapter, provides the sought after "inner material 
connec:tion" between God and hum,:1.nity, 
revolution and human revolution. 
faith and history, God's 
In the next chapter_it is argued that this 'inner material 
connection', established by God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ 
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as both truly God and truly human, provides the historical 
'turning point' which makes human praxis possible. In the 
analoqia fidei, as the positive relationship between theory and 
praxis, God's revolution and human revolution, humanity can 
discern God's original and final Yes. Consequently, the No of the 
dialectic chasm is subsumed by the Yes of this analogical 
relationship as faith positively seeks understanding: 
Faith is not in conflict with understanding, but differs 
from it only in degree (not in kind). Understanding starts 
from the object present in faith and arrives at rational 
knowledge of it. 1 2 
Yet, Fides quaerens intellectum, as a new epistemological 
foundation for theology, also places important conditions upon 
theological discourse. These conditions replace the dialectic as 
the source o~ humility in theological debate, whilst at the same 
time providing for the positive nature of theology obscured in 
dialectic thinking. This objective conditioning of theology 
exposes the limitations of all theological statements, while 
simultaneously affirming the possibility of theological 
statements as analogies to the object of faith. Because of the 
object's free decision to make its rationality accessible to 
humanity through revelation, analogous human formulations of the 
divine can be attempted. Yet, theological certainty is to be 
regarded as relative, whilst the certainty of faith derived from 
the absoluteness of God, which theology seeks to understand, is 
not. Further, because of this relativity, progress in theology is 
possible as it seeks to understand the object of faith within the 
limits of the criterion of theology: the Scriptures. It is this 
note of progress which heralds the permanent quest for better 
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understanding and better analogies to the incomprehensibility cf 
God. Theology does not, however, merely repeat Scripture but 
seeks to understand the object of faith in the light of, and 
without contradicting the Scriptures. Finally, tru~ to Barth's 
emphasis on praxis, theology must be grounded in faith that is in 
the final analysis obedience to God: 
, •• it goes without saying that where faith is really faith, 
that is to say obedience, the fight between bats and owls 
over the reality of the sun's rays will just not hap~en and 
that a theology that is grounded on the obedience of faith 
will be positive theology. 13 
Here again we encounter the inseparability of theory and praxis, 
faith and history, God's revolution and human revolution, in 
Barth's thinking. 
In summation this shift in Barth's theology affects the concept 
of the revolution of God in two ways: Firstly, it provides Barth 
with a theological grounding, distinct but not remote from faith, 
for God as the original revolution from which all revolutions 
derive their existence. God is at one and the same moment both 
nearest to hand and most distant: 
God Himself is the nearest to hand, as the absolutely simple 
must be, and at the same time the most distant, as the 
absolutely simple must also be. God Himself is the 
irresolvable and at the same time that which fills and 
embraces everything else .•• God is simple ••• -so simple that 
He reduces everyone to silence, and then allows and requires 
everyone boldly to make Him the object of their thought and 
speech. (CD II, 1, p.458) 
The door opened to the assumption of God's existence as the 
proper basis from which faith seeks to·make understandable the 
God who has elected to make Godself accessible to humanity. In 
this way ''understanding can only be derived from God , and not 
God from understanding''. 14 God is God's own basis and no 
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independent verification of God is required. Hence, God's 
revolution is God's alone and cannot be derived from, nor 
validated by any other reality. Barth met the force of 
Feuerbach's critique by establishing God as the primary reality 
upon whom all secondary realities depend. This truly 
revolutionary God does ,not need to be demonstrated, merely 
understood and obeyed. 
Sec<.1nd 1 y, this concept of God is not based on the negative 
"infinite qualitative distinction" between God and humanity but 
rather on the positive possibility of analogous relationships 
between the reality of God and human formulations about God. 
Since theology is fides quaerens intellectum its task is to seek 
to understand the object of faith by using appropriate, but 
relative, analogies by which the absoluteness of God could become 
intelligible to finite humanity. The search for these analogies 
proceeds in the humble recognition of the limits of human 
undf~rstandi nq: 
The attempt may and must be made within the limits of human 
cognition, to ask about the truth, to distinguish the true 
from the false, and continually to carry the "approximationa 
further - although always knowing that the goal is as such 
is attainable only to faith and not to our viewing or 
conceiving as such. This means, to seek after better human 
views and concepts in closer correspondence with their 
object, and therefore, so far as we are able, to make the 
witness to the reality of God more complete and clear. <CD 
II,1, p204) 
In this way Barth is able to retain the dialectic's positive 
purpose of emphasising the transcendence of God, whilst 
overcoming the radical separation between God and humanity by 
primarily defining the problem as one of understanding. This 
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means that God's revolution is not only made intelligible to 
humanity as God elects to make Godself. known in Jesus Christ, but 
through this self-revelation a positive analogous relationship 
between the revolution of God and human revolution becomes 
possible. The primary task of theology is then to understand the 
essence and nature of the revolution of God.in Jesus Christ, 
because Jesus is the historical correspondence to this revolution 
from above. From this task the true possibility or impossibility 
of human revolution will emerge. To put it in Barthian language, 
the true starting point of theology is the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ and not the faith of humanity. Consequently, the 
only basis for human theory and praxis is the transcendence of 
God made immanent in Jesus. Jesus is the ground, limit and 
orientation of all human statements, praxis and revolutions. 
And yet, the intention of the dialectic method is not lost. The 
designation of God as aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari poss it 
preserves the essential emphasis on the incomprehensibility of 
God and the qualitative distinction between God and humanity. 
Nonetheless, God and humanity are positively related through the 
faith that seeks understanding, ensuring that humanity is not 
deified and God is not anthropomorphically conceived. For this 
thesis, human revolution is both de-absolutised and 
constructively directed by the revolution of God. 
By way of critique we need to note two matters. The first, of 
philosophical interest, cannot be developed within the context of 
this thesis. The second forms the basis of a critique which will 
be more full developed at a later stage. 
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Firstly, it is a philosophical mystery how Barth makes the 
connection between the general concept of God as aliquid quo 
r,.ihil maius coqitari possit and the particular Christian 
conception of God. Surely God can be conceived in this way by 
people of all theistic faiths, particularly revelation based 
faiths a proposition which Barth might not support. There is no 
1 ogi cal reason why the analogous understanding of God issuing 
from faith in a God other than that of the Christian faith should 
not be equally valid. This plunges us into the murky waters of 
having to devise or derive criteria for the evaluation of that 
which is properly basic in talk about God. 1 ~ Barth himself would 
probably reply that whilst this is an interesting philosophical 
question it is out of place within the discipline of Christian 
theology. To which the reply is that in an increasingly 
pluralistic religious context such matters demand consideration. 
Nonetheless, this question will take us too far from the heart of 
this thesis and this brief note will have to suffice. 
Secondly, the formulation fides quaerens intellectum may have 
provided Barth with a way beyond the charge of Feuerbach but it 
falls foul of Marx's critique of Feuerbach: 
Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it. 16 
Whilst the emphasis on obedience (praxis) in Barth's theology is 
never absent, and the whole of his project is directed towards 
finding an adequate basis for human praxis, would it not have 
been more consistent for him to speak rather of faith in search 
of transformation or praxis rather than understanding? In this 
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way the praxiological goal of Barth's theology would have been 
methodologically entrenched. Further, Ltnderstandi ng is 
presupposed in the concept of transformation and therefore 
nothing of Barth's emphasis would be lost. Could much of the 
subsequent misappropriation of Barth's theology not have been 
avoided had he made it clear from the outset that his final 
purpose was to attest to the transformation of reality in Jesus 
Christ, and human action that corresponds to that transformation? 
It is not enough to make obedience a qualification of faith's 
search for understanding because understanding too easily becomes 
an end in itself. Obedience must be seen to be the primary search 
of faith with understanding as a qualification. It is precisely 
this inversion of Barthian methodological priorities that a 
Marxian critique requires, and evidence of this method is to be 
found in the emergence of liberation theologies. 17 The danger of 
this reversal lies in the possibility of becoming so pre-occupied 
with human praxis that the theological basis of that praxis, the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ, can be neglected. 
3.2 THE ESSENCE AND NATURE OF GOD. 
From these epistemological foundations it is possible to expand 
upon the essence and nature of God as the basis for the 
revolution of God. Th,~oughout his theology Barth is "c:onsumed 
with a pasision for God", but this passion is not for a deity 
removed from the realities of history but for One whose essence 
and actions are inseparable. 18 
This reinforces the impression that, for Barth, theory and praxis 
- even the theory and praxis of God - are indissolubly linked. 
The God who is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit reveals 
Godself as God for humanity and hence the being of God in Godself 
cannot be isolated from God's act for humankind. Yet, the being 
and the act of God are also not to be identified with one 
another. Separation would imply a God removed· from and unaffected 
by human history, identity would result in a God which is merely 
an anthropomorphic projection of human needs and desires. The 
only way beyond this dilemma is to ensure inseparability of the 
being and the act of God without identifying them. 
evident throughout Barth's theology: 
For God will be known as the One He is. But precisely as the 
One He is, He acts. It is as this One who acts, however, 
that He will be known. (CD II,1 p26) 
This is 
But this God has acted in human history in Jesus Chri3t and 
therefore God does not exist for humanity apart from Jesus: 
The Word, and therefore God Himself, does not exist for us 
apart from the human-being of Christ. (CO 1,2 p166) 
In the Humanity of God Barth expands: 
It is when we look at Jesus Christ that we know decisively 
that God's deity does not exclude, but includes His 
hu1anity ••• How could God's deity exclude His humanity, 
since it is God's freedom for love and thus His capacity to 
be not only the great but the small, not only in and for 
Himself but also with another distinct from Him ••. It is His 
act. His is and remains the first and decisive Word, His the 
initiative, His the leadership •.. but we must, however, look 
further and recognise the fact that actually His deity 
encloses hu1anity in itself. In Him the fact is once and for 
all established that God does not exist without man. 19 
All this is possible only because God is the One who loves in the 
freedom of God's trinitarian essence. As trinity God is free to 
sufficient in Godself, devoid of external necessity, and 
as such, free to elect to be the God of humanity. In this sense 
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the trinitarian structure of Barth's theology becomes apparent. 
It is this initiative and dec:ision c)f God, to be the God of 
humanity, that is disclosed in the act of God in Jesus Christ. 
The two operative concepts that give definition to the essenc:e 
and nature of God are included in title of chapter 28 of Church 
lJ09mati.-:s: "The Being of God as the One \IJho Loves in Freedom". It 
is therefore to an examination of God's love and freedom that 
attention is now given. Marquardt argues that the understanding 
of God as the One who loves in freedom is Barth's application of 
Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: 





basis for interpreting the world but the fact 
transforms it ••• Those who think that it 
theological ontology of transcendence are 
who see that it is essentially political. are 
Barth's quest is not for an intellectually satisfying concept of 
God, but for a way of comprehending the incomprehensible as a 
basis for radical political praxis. This God who loves in freedom 
provides that basis. 
3.2.1. The Love of God. 
Following the concept of the.unity of the being and act of God, 
Barth insists that 11 81:,d is" means "God 1 oves". God's act is "that 
of One who loves" and this love is only accessiblE~ to humanity 
because it is revealed in God's act. 21 
If we say with 1 Jn 4 that God is love, the converse that 
love is God is forbidden until it is mediated and clarified 
from God's being and therefore from God's act what the love 
is which can and must be legitimately identified with God. 
<CD II,1 p276l 
This love, revealed in the act of God, discloses God's existence 
in Godself as the one who loves without external compulsion. 
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God's love is primarily the intrinsic love within the Holy 
Trinity which precedes, bL1t . it inc: l udes God's e:.: tr .. i nsi c lave 
toward humanity. The extrinsic dimension of love is dependent 
upon and reflects the primacy of the intrinsic love. God lQves 
Henc:e, because God is love. 
makes love necessary, 
of the human condition. 
because it is not human misery that 
in God's being alone. 
God's love toward humanity is independent 
The necessity of God's love is grounded 
God's act of love causes humanity to be 
'taken up' into God's eternal love and thus love is restored as 
the foundation of all human being. 
in which God includes humanity, 
But this revolutionary act, 
is God's alone, it is the 
revolution of God's love. Love as the essence of God's 
trinitarian being creates the foundation and limit for all other 
loves. The centrality of Barth's analysis of love necessitates a 
return to this theme when considering the praxis of God in Jesus 
Christ in the following chapter. For now it is enough to conclude 
that God's free act of love toward humanity establishes a 
revolution for hu~anity that is grounded in God alone, 
includes total human transformation. 
3.2.2 The Freedom of God. 
and yet 
Also basic to the being - act paradigm is the concept of the 
f, ... eedom of God. It follows from what has been said above that if 
God is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit only God is truly 
free and God's freedom is the pre-supposition of all knowledge of 
God and hence all other freedoms. 
The freedom of God, Barth suggests, is God's very own. Ontically 
it is the freedom within God's trinitarian essence of the Father 
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• 
fer the Son and the Son for the Father in the unity of the 
Spirit. Noetically ''it is the sovereign grace wherein God chooses 
to commit Hi m~;el f to man. 1122 Hence, the freedom of God is 
primarily a freedom for and not from. Yet within this freedom God 
is' on the one hand, independent from all that is not God, 
whilst, on the other hand, the dependence of all that is not God 
upon God is maintained. Flowing from the proposition that God is 
free in Godself, Barth comments: 
When we have established this first proposition that God is 
He who is free in Himself, we can express His aseity in a 
second proposition, that He is the One who is free from all 
origination, conditioning or determination from without, by 
that which is not Himself. (CD II,1 p307) 
:t t ·follows that: 
There exists no synthesis in which the same attribute, 
whether being, spirit, life or love, can be predicated in 
the same sense both of God and of something else. CCD 11 1 1 
p310) 
In transcedence God's freedom is the freedom to be the Creator of 
the creature, as well as the One who at any moment can transform 
(or ternli nate> the being of that creature. Nonetheless, God 
chooses to exercise a freedom in immanence in which God does not 
remain aloof from creation, but becomes present to creation in 
that which is not God: 
He does not detach Himself from it (the creature) in an 
alien aloofness, but is present as the being of its being ••• 
God can allow this other which is so utterly distinct from 
Himself to live and move and have its being within Himself. 
(CD II,1 p314l 
However·, God's freedom in transcendence cannot be isolated from 
God's freedom in immanence. Only because God is incomprehensibly 
transcendent is God free to immanently reveal Godself a$ being 
t·or humanity. This divine immanence is supremely manifested in 
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the revelation of Godself in Jesus Christ, who is the 
"possibility of all other possibilities" of tht-:? e>:ercise of the 
freedom of God. 23 The freedom of divine immanence cannot 
legitimately be sought anywher~ but in Jesus Christ in whom God 
has loved the world in freedom. 
Consequently, the freedom of God disclosed in Jesus Christ, is 
the sole origin and limit of all human freedom, and any $earch 
for the content of freedom apart from God's freedom will 
inevitably lead to idolatry. For this reason Barth asks and 
answers an important question: 
Where else can we learn that freedom exists and what it is, 
except in confrontation with God's own freedom offered to us 
as the source and measure of all freedom? 24 
Accordingly, the only way to discover true humanity and freedom 
is to start with the essential freedom of God from which all 
freedom is derived. Human freedom is, therefore, not a 'natural' 
attribute of humanity but a gift of God's grace, and any talk of 
this natural freedom must be secondary to, and included in this 
gift. All revolutionary human struggles for freedom derive their 
concrete meaning and orientation from God's freedom alone. Human 
freedom di~orced from the freedom of God is captivity. 
It is within this consideration that Barth's polemic with 
natural theology must be seen, for only within the pre-
supposition of God as the One who loves in freedom can God truly 
be God. N,:~tural theology undermines the freedom of God by 
positing a source for the knowledge of the essence of God apart 
from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Gollwitzer shows that 
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it was precisely for the reason that natural theology reduces the 
transcendent freedom of God from a revolutionary concept to a 
merely reformist one, that Barth so scathingly attacked 
B~unner. Gollwitzer clarifies: 
Reformism thinks in terms of the permanence of the system; 
revolution is a transcending of the system. A revolutionary 
attitude reaches for the qualitatively new in the light of 
which the status quo appears as the old which can and ought 
to be overcome, as that which can no longer be regenerated 
by its own powers,2e 
But the noetically new, the true revolution, can only come from 
the ontically different, the True Revolutionary, who is made 
accessible to humanity in God's free self-revelation in Jesus 
Christ. For Barth, it is this definitive act of God which 
discloses both the trinitarian being of God in Godself and the 
act of God for humanity. Only this God has a sufficiently 
revolutionary existence over and against humanity; only the act 
of love in freedom of this God can truly radically transform 
human existence. The proper basis for human existence, love and 
freedom can only be found in divine existence, love and freedom. 
God's revolution establishes the foundational possibility or 
impossibility of human revolutions. An analysis of the content of 
the revolution of God in the person of Jesus Christ, undertaken 
in the next chapter, will further expand upon the nature of love 
and freedom. And in the fifth chapter the relationship between 
the freedom of God and the command of God receives attention. 
In summation, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, 
Barth's long search for the possibility of talking about God and 
humanity, whilst neither seperating nor equating the two, finds 
its basis in the God who is aliquid quo nihil maius coqitari 
possit and has revealed Godself to be for humanity as the One who 
loves in freedom. This alone provides a foundation from which the 
revolution of God addresses humanity in such a way as to 
introduce the qualitatively new into the old status quo. This 
concept cf God is free from all reversible relationships and 
organic connections between Godself and humanity, and is a true 
Arc:himedean point for all hl.ttni:,n activity. Hen,~i n Barth's 
Ltnderstandi ng of the Go~;;pel in Romans as the "hinge" rather than 
the "door" is given its full theological foundation, for in 
Godself the whole of created reality finds its centre, the reason 
for its existence and the possibility of its transformation. 2 • 
Yet human praxis is given positive potential through the arialogia 
relatioriis in which relative, but indispensible, parables of the 
being and act of God are enacted by human beings in history on 
the road towards the full understanding of the object of faith. 
In this way faith in the God who lives and loves in freedom 
necessitates corresponding human responses. The revolution of God 
not only makes human revolution possible but i mperat.i ve. 
Nonetheless, relative nature of these little human 
revolutions will make it equally imperative that the revolution 
be a permanent process which does not end until faith has 
achieved full obedience and understanding. But what shape will 
human revolution take and to what must it cor-respond? 
Consequently, it is instructive to analyse the free act of God's 
love in the person of Jesus Christ for He is the r-evolution of 
Geld i n<:arnate. The being-act paradigm of God finds its immanent 
parallel in the Chalcedonian formula of the two natures of Christ 
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as truly God and truly human. 
revolution of God. 
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This is the centre of the 
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JESUS CHRIST: THE REVOLUTION OF GOD. 
Presupposing an understanding of the epistemological foundations 
of Barth's thinking, which grounds the revolution of God in God 
alone and not in any idealisation of humanity, we now move to his 
central concern. From the conceptualisation of God as that beyond 
which nothing greater can be conceived, Barth now takes a 
Kierkegaardian leap of faith to the assumption that this divine 
being has revealed Godself to humanity in the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Ultimately, God's revolution is christological as 
God's objectivity is made accessible to human cognition in the 
revelation and election of Jesus Christ. In Jesus the revolution 
of God is given form and content because this Jesus establishes 
and discloses the possibility of the qualitative change in which 
the alienation of God from humanity and humanity from God is 
overcome and true and f Lill humanity is restored. This 
reconciliation happens on the basis of the two natures of Jesus 
as both truly God and truly human. 
4.1 TWO-NATURES CHRISTOLOSY. 
Any sound christological discussion will necessarily start 
not only with an explanation of the vere Deus which declares 
the equality of Jesus Christ with God, but with an 
explanation of the vere hoao which declares his equality 
with us. (CD IV, 2, p26f) 
With this starting point Barth clarifies that in Jesus it is not 
only possible but imperative to talk simultaneously of God and 
humanity without either identifying or separating them. This 
christological centre makes possible a 'theological anthropol~gy' 
which allows for the true knowledge of humanity as well as a 
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theology which allows far the true knowledge of God.~ Later Barth 
stated it as follows: 
, •• exactly in this way Jesus Christ as this Mediator and 
Reconciler between God and Man, is also the Revealer of them 
both. We do not need to engage in a free-ranging 
investigation to seek out and construct who and what God 
truly is, and who and what man truly is, but only to read 
the truth about both where it resides, namely, in the 
fullness of their togetherness, their covenant which 
proclaims itself in Jesus Christ. 2 
It is in the incarnation of Jesus that God graciou~ly gives 
Godself, as the One who loves in freedom, to humanity, and at the 
same time includes humanity within the divine. This movement, 
which is wholly from above to below, makes possible 
corresponding but differentiated movement from below to above. It 
is, as such, a revolution within Godself conducted on behalf of, 
and freely given for humanity, yet this revolution includes full 
participation of both human and divine essence in their union in 
the person of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Fu~ther, this Jesus is like other human beings in sharing the 
human essence, but unlike all others in being truly human, and is 
thus the embodiment of a restored covenant between God and 
humanity. In this unlikeness Jesus has an existence which is 
revolutionary over and against existing perceptions of humanity, 
thus calling the prevailing forms cf humanity radically into 
question. As the one in whom true humanity finds both its origin 
and its reconciliation with the divine essence, Jesus humanises 
and thus transforms all human being and action. Henceforth 
humanity is defined in terms of the being and actions of Jesus of 
Nazareth, and these actions disclose the purpose of the 
incarnation to be the establishment of the possibility of being 
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and staying human in the world. 3 Human existence and all human 
activity, including revolution, 
perspective of Jesus. Henceforth, 
being and action of humanity. 
are to be seen from the 
it is Jesus who defines the 
Accordingly, Barth sees Jesus of Nazareth as the human analogy of 
divine essence and action. "He r-eflects God." 4 This analogous or 
corresponding existence of Jesus pr-ovides the foundational 
possibility for subsequent human activity to also bear this 
analogy or correspondence. 
There are three discernible strata in this analogical conception: 
Firstly and originally, 
providing the original 
God is God in community with Godself, 
thesis from which all analogies are 
derived; secondly, Jesus as the primar-y correspondence to the 
being of God amongst and for humanity, locates historically the 
origin of all human analogies; and thirdly, the possibility of 
human praxis bearing secondary but positive analogy to the act of 
God in Jesus is established. Jesus is for humanity because God is 
for humanity and human existence for God and one another is 
possible because of God's revelatory initiative. Not.f:?, h<:>~1ever , 
that both organic connection and reversibility are specifically 
excluded in these analogous relationships, and as such the 
analogy is always an analogia relationis and never an analogia 
entis.e In terms of the discussion in chapters two and three, the 
inner material connection between God and humanity is not to be 
found in an organic link but in an analogy grounded in a 
relationship of faith which preserves the distinction without 
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breaking the connection. Barth summarise~ as follows: 
His (Jesus) humanity is not, of course, his divinity. In His 
divinity He is from and to God. In His humanity He is fro• 
and to the cosmos. And God is not the cosmos, nor the cosmos 
God. But His humanity is in the closest correspondence with 
His divinity. It mirrors and reflects it. Conversely, His 
divinity has its correspondence in the humanity in which it 
is mirrored. At this point, therefore, there is similarity. 
Each is to be recognised in the other. Thus even the life of 
the man Jesus stands under a two-fold determination. As He 
is for God, so He is for man, and as He is for man, so He is 
for God; (CD III, 2, p21bl 
Consequently, Barth consistently reject$ the Catholic concept of 
analogia entis because it fails to emphasise and clarify the 
"triumph of qrace" in Jesus alone. Even in those passages which 
the Roman Catholic theologian, von Balthasar, identifies as 
implying Barth's alleged acceptance of the analogia entis, 
Barth's primary motif of the analogia relationis prevails.b This 
is conclusively argued by Berkouwer: 
Barth continues to reject the analogia entis radically. It 
constitutes an attack on the divine initiative shown in 
grace, it infringes upon the power and the triumph of grace 
in its antithesis to the inability and lost condition of the 
sinner. The triumph of free grace is the counter- pole to 
the analogia entis. 7 
Recognising that Barth would prefer that reference should be to 
the triumph of Jesus Christ as the objective revelation of God 
rather than the abstract concept of grace, the point, nonetheless 
remains: the inner material connection between God and humanity 
is not one of essence, and thus organic, but one of relationship. 
Anderson argues: 
There is no 'connective tissue' which ties human being to 
divine being, •• Barth argues. One cannot ascend 'hand over 
hand', by way of an ontological 'umbilical chord', from 
human being to the being of God. Thus Barth rejects not only 
the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of being (analogia 
entis) but he rejects the claims of a natural theology which 
attempts to begin with the assumption of correspondence 
between the human and the divine and establish criteria for 
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our knowledge of or relation to God independently of God's 
gracious act of revelation.• 
There remains a qualitative distinction between human and divine 
being, yet the analogia relationis provides for a positive 
correspondence of unlike entities. This analogia relationis is 
further an analogia fidei in that faith, as the gift of God's 
grace, is the medium which sustains the relationship. 
Brunner agrees with Barth's criticism of the Catholic concept of 
the analogia entis as the basis for theologia naturalis, but 
believes that in the light of the biblical principle of the imago 
dei something of the concept must remain. It. is in Barth's 
redefinition of the concept of the analogia fidei that Brunner 
finds a response to this question.• Yet, Brunner is correct in 
asserting that is no way the app,arent. 
'anthropomorphisms' implicit in the similarity between human and 
divine "speech" and .. ,...,ord". Barth later concedes this in 
developing "structural" concept of the Ima go De i. 10 
Non<~thel ess, the question still remains as to how the limits of 
the 'apparent anthropomorphisms' allowed under this structural 
concept will be set. This does net, however, detract from the 
force of Barth's critique of the analogia entis as the basis for 
natural theology.11 
The Lutheran concept of the communicatio idiomatum, which 
e>:h:ibits a "c:haracteristic: inversion of abc::lve and below, heaven 
and earth, God and man'', is equally problematic for Barth. 
It fails to clarify the irreversible nature of the relationship 
God and humanity.12 The communicatio idiomatum 
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hypothesised that ''Christ's human nature partakes directly in his 
divine majesty; his divinity partakes directly in his human 
su·fferi ng", whilst Barth supported the alternative view known as 
the Extra Calivinisticum which Hunsingef clarifies as follows: 13 
In contrast to the Lutheran view, the Reformed conception 
was more nearly paradoxical than dialectic: Christ's human 
nature does not directly participate in his divine majesty; 
rather, it does so indirectly by remaining finite and 
creaturely even as it is joined hypostatically to his 
divinity. By the same token, Christ's divinity does not 
directly partake in his human suffering; rather it does so 
indirectly by remaining infinite and eternal even as it is 
joined hypostatically to his humanity. 14 
,In this way Barth assures both the unity and the autonomy of the 
two natures of Christ in such a way that divinity is not limited 
by humanity nor is humanity subsumed by divinity. The divine is 
truly divine and the human, truly human. Barth never changed his 
mind on the assertion that the only way to counter Feuerbach's 
critique was to ensure "that man's relation with God is in every 
re~;,pect, in principle, an irr·eversible relation". 115 The ar,alogia 
re 1 at i or, is, therefore, insists on the humanity of the human and 
the divinity of the divine, and radically rejects any deification 
of humanity - an emphasis which persisted from Barth's early 
dialectic period. 
Further clarification of this relationship between the two 
natures of Christ is found, for Barth, in the concepts of 
enhypostasis and anhypostasis. The force of these concepts is to 
establish that, within the unity of the two natures, the humanity 
of Christ has its existence in (enhypostasis) his divinity and 
has no other mode of existence <anhypostasis) apart from this 
divinity. In this way, despite the unity of the two natures, the 
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supremacy of the eternal Logos is established and the 
irreversibility of the relationship is secured. 16 
In summation, the distinction between the two natures of Jesus 
maintains the wholly other existence of God over and against 
created reality whilst the unity of the two natures establishes, 
through the analogia relationis, the inner material connection 
between faith and history, God and humanity, the revolution of 
God and human revolution. The former is the No whilst the latter 
is the Yes of God both spoken to humanity in the person of Jesus. 
Of primary significance is that this initiating act and gift of 
God, which originates entirely in'Godself, frames, limits and 
provides the impetus for all other initiatives. Nothing can be 
added to what God has said and done in Jesus, it can only be 
repeated. Human freedom and love is entirely enclosed in the 
freedom and love of God disclosed in the incarnate Lord. Apart 
from Jesus there is nothing to say about either humanity or God. 
In terms of this thesis Jesus is the original and true 
revolutionary in whom all subsequent revolutions find their 
genesis, prototype and meaning. Our task is to begin with the 
humanity of Jesus, and nowhere else, for in understanding him the 
nature of the revolution of God, and thus the ground, 
orientation of analogous human praxis, is made explicit: 
In the existence of Jesus Christ, the fact that God speaks, 
gives, orders, comes absolutely first - that man hears, 
receives, obeys, can and may only follow this first act. In 
Jesus Christ man's freedom is wholly enclosed in the freedo• 
of God. 17 
4.2 JESUS THE REVOLUTIONARY. 
limit and 
Who according to Barth, is this revolutionary from whom all 
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human 'little revolutions' are derived? Once again the caution 
applies that to ask such a question is to prompt a summary of the 
entirety of Barth's theological project. Of necessity, therefore, 
this discussion is selective and indicates the directions in 
which more comprehensive study would lead us. 
The four ways in which the "r-oyal man" car-responds to the 
existence and nature of God provide us with the clues to Bart.h's 
answer to these questions. 1 e In this section of Dogmatics Barth 
describes the kingly work of the historical Jesus of the Gospels, 
who is "very man e>:alted and reconciled". It is here that the 
central significance of the humanity of Jesus is emphasised: 
For it is here that the decisions are made. There is no 
other legitimate way to the understanding of the christian 
life than which we enter here. <CD IV,2 p156) 
The humanity of Jesus, in which Barth locates Jesus in his 
historical context, provides the logical starting point for this 
analysis. After describing the distinctiveness of the presence of 
Jesus, Barth proceeds to analyse the ways in which Jesus, a$ the 
true human being, corresponds to God. 19 These correspondences to 
divine being demonstrate the hypothesis that Jesus is not merely 
included in the revolution of God but embodies that revolution. 
In the language of Tambach: The Or-iginal Synthesis (God) becomes 
the thesis (humanity> in order to disclose within Godself and for-
humanity the indissoluble antithesis and the final synthesis 
which makes the radical transformation of reality possible. All 
of this happens and is revealed in the two-fold person of Jesus 
Christ and is, as such, a revolution wholly from and of God. The 
existence of Jesus is described in this context as follows: 
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, •• as a man He exists analogously to the mode of 
of God. In what He thinks and wills and does, 
attitude, there is a correspondence, a parallel 
creaturely world, to the plan and purpose and work 





These correspondences serve as windows into Barth's theology 
which are supplemented from wider reading. 
4.2.1 Power and weakness: Solidarity with the Original Synthesis. 
The first correspondence is related by Barth as follows: 
The royal man shares as such the strange destiny which falls 
on God in His people and the world - to be the One who is 
ignored and forgotten and despised and discounted by men ••• 
His power is present to men in the form of weakness, His 
glory in that of lowliness, His victory in that of defeat. 
His final concealment is that of His suffering and death as 
a condemned criminal. He who alone is rich is present as the 
poorest of the poor. <CD IV,2, p167: KD p186.) 
Significant in this context are Jesus' share in the rejection and 
suffering of God, and the concepts of power and powerlessness. 
Here we encounter the mystery of the passion, suffering and death 
of Jesus of Nazareth, in whi 1::h we are confronted by the "Judge 
who in this passion takes the place of those who ought to be 
judged''. 20 The rejection and passion of the person Jesus is the 
suffering of God in which the destruction that threatens all ,, 
creation, and thus God as creator, is confronted by God. It is 
God in God's free will taking responsibility in this one human 
being to remove the separation between creature and creator; it 
is God's resounding and revolutionary No to all that threatens 
God's creation and creatures. Inevitably the human being Jesus of 
Nazareth, in bearing correspondence to this No of God, shares the 
rejection and suffering implicit in the No. Thus, God takes human 
suffering seriously by including it in the praxis of God in the 
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humanity of Jesus. 21 
Furthermore, in his humiliation and death, Jesus confronts the 
powerful of his time with an image of powerles~ness and 
lowliness. This reveals the nature of the power of God as power 
which comes in the form of lowliness, weakness, humility and even 
humiliation. Barth contends ''that in this humiliation God i~ 
supremely God'' because it is precisely here that the covenant 
between God and humanity is re-established on the basis of the 
obedience of the human being, Jesus of Nazareth. 
In this passion there is legally re-established the covenant 
between God and man, broken by man but kept by God. On that 
one day of the suffering of that One there took place the 
comprehensive turning in the history of all creation - with 
all that this involves. <CD IV,1 p246) 
The humiliation of Jesus establishes the turning point, the 
revolution, that comes from God within human history. Henceforth 
all power is to be seen in the light of the power of humility and 
servanthood, the power of powerlessness and weakness. The 
humanity of Jesus revolutionises all human definitions of power, 
and overshadows and radically questions the glory of the least 
and the greatest human kingdoms. In Lehmanns words: 
To the weakness of power, Jesus juxtaposes the power of 
weakness. 22 
Consequently, the humanity of God in Jesus becomes the criterion 
for the understanding and exercise of human power, which is not 
to be measured against God's indefinable omnipotence but in terms 
of the presence and suffering of the human Jesus amongst 
humanity. 
The implication here is, firstly, that only powerlessness is able 
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to truly effect a transformation in the human misuse and abuse of 
power, and it is only the weak who can 'evangelise' the powerful 
in such a way that human existence is truly humanised and the 
abuse of power is not merely inverted. 23 This means that although 
theologically speaking the possibility of transformation is 
est1abl i shed 'from above' , in a sociological sense actual human 
change can only come 'from below' because God in Jesus Christ has 
elected to reveal Godself 'below'. Hope for true humanity comes 
not from the rich and powerful? but from the excluded and 
oppressed on the margins of society. This has profound 
consequences for ecclesiology. It presupposes a church of the 
poor and oppressed which actively seeks the transformation of the 
human reality oppressing its people. The 1r,eakness, humiliation 
and rejection of Jesus is a perpetual and revolutionary negation 





constant confrontation between the prevailing 
of power and the powerlessness of Jesus is 
Ethically this requires permanent confrontation with 
human power because failure to do so results, implicitly or-
e>: p 1 i c i t. l y , in the "objective sacral i sat ion of powf.:~r". 24 This 
follows from the reality that in a world v,hich has "fallen away" 
from God the only legitimate place for the true human being, the 
human being in obedience to God, is in the "same obscL1re .;;md 
shameful corne1'"" to which the world has rel eg,.:it<?.d God. 215 
The exercise of human power is perpetually negated by a 
revolutionary reversal of prevailing definitions and an 
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insistence on the power of weakness. The powerlessness and 
poverty of Jesus, which is analogous to the powerlessness and 
poverty of God rejected in the world, can only be given human 
expression in the form of the refusal of power. This alone 
provides the necessary impetus fer the qualitativ~ transformation 
of humanity and creation. Brueggemann instructively captures the 
significance of this reversal of power: 
That tradition of radical criticism is about the self-giving 
emptiness of Jesus, about dominion through the loss of 
dominion, and about fulness coming only by self-emptying. 
The emptying is not to be related to a meditative self-
negating, for it is a thoroughly political image concerned 
with the willing surrender of power; it is the very thing 
kings cannot do and yet remain kings. Thus the entire royal 
self-understanding is refuted. The empty one who willingly 
surrendered power for obedience is the ultimately powerful 
one who can permit humanness where no other has authority ta 
do so. 26 
Consequently, truly revolutionary human praMis does not consist 
in the replacement of one form of human power with another? but 
in the exposure of tiie weakness of all human power and the 
affirmation uf the power of powerlessness. This affirmation could 
be interpreted in two divergent ways: On the one hand it could be 
regarded as the permanent anarchistic negation of all human 
power; or it could be accused of idealistically ignoring the 
necessity for and ambiguity implicit in the human exercise of 
power. Barth's American critics, most notably Reinhold Niebuhr, 
challenged his theology on this very point. 27 However, the point 
is: Whilst Niebuhr and others operated pragmatically from within 
the dominant American exercise of power, and thus 
reformistically, Barth demanded a more radical questioning of the 
possibility of the legitimate exercise of human power, and was 
thus essentially revolutionary - even anarchistic. The 
powerlessness of Jesus therefore restated in theological form 
what Barth had said more politically earlier: there is no form of 
legality that is not ultimately illegal, no form of authority 
that is not ultimately based on tyranny. This does not mean that 
Barth, in pr-actice, denied the necessity of human authority. He 
merely established the relativity and self-destructive nature of 
power and insisted on its perpetual negation in the search for 
truly human life. The only way beyond this impasse exists in a 
revolutionary affimation of the power of the powerless. This is 
what may best be described as eschatological anarchism, and is 
more fully discussed in the next chapter. 
4.2.2 Solidarity with the poor: Identification with the Thasis. 
If the power of weakness alone is truly revolutionary then the 
second correspondence follows from the first: 
It is of a piece with this that - almost to the point of 
prejudice - He (Jesus> ignored all those who are high and 
mighty and wealthy in the world in favour of the weak and 
meek and lowly. He did this even in the moral sphere, 
ignoring the just for the sinners, and in the spiritual 
sphere, finally ignoring Israel for the Gentiles. It Wis to 
the latter group and not the former that he found himself 
called. (CD IV,2 p16B-9l KD p188.) 
Throughout the breadth of Barth's theology this perspective is 
consistently clear. As early as the first edition of Romans, 
Bartl, insists that God "is cme-·sidedly a God <:>f the lowly" and 
throughout Church Dogmatics the theme is the same. It is 
important to examine in greater detail how Barth expressed this 
theme because of its significance for human praxis, as well as 
its currency in present theological debate. 29 
Firstly, this solidarity of Jesus with the poor is not primarily 
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founded in a projected humanistic compassion but in Jesus' 
correspondence to the God who has been relegated to obscurity and 
poverty by the world. Because God is poor in the world so also is 
Jesus, and in this poverty re-establishes the humanity of all 
people who, with God have been banished to the shadows of life. 
Jesus' solidarity with the thesis (humanity) is the logical 
historical consequence of his identification with .the Original 
Synthesis (God). In this way Barth refuses to allow the 
possibility of God being a projection of human need or 
experience. Jesus stands with the poor, not because the poor have 
or because their cause for liberation is just, or because 
they possess any qualities that commend them to God, but 
primarily because God is poor in this world. 
Accordingly, it is through and amongst the poor that God is 
accessible to humanity. And further, true humanity is only 
possible in community with the marginalised of society. This 
primary solidarity of Jesus with God inevitably leads, by 
analogy, to his secondary solidarity with the poor and lowly. 
Therefore, it is in solidarity with the poor alone that humanity 
is liberated to bear analogous witness to the being and act of 
God. The poverty of Jesus corresponds to the poverty of God, and 
thus the humanity of Jesus amongst the poor is grounded, 
orientated and limited by God's revolutionary rejection of the 
definitions of humanness, wealth and poverty cf the 0orld. If 
human praxis is to correspond to divine praxis it must be founded 
on God's revolutionary partisanship with the poor and lowly and 
must reflect the same bias. In short, the church and the 
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christian must opt for solidarity with the poor in correspondence 
to God's act in Jesus. 
Hence for Barth, in contrast to the main stream of liber·atic::m 
theologians, solidarity with the poor is founded in God's 
revolution from above and not in revolutionary consciousness from 
below. 30 This does not mean that God's movement from above does 
not issue in a corresponding human movement from below. The point 
is that the source and impetus of this human movement is found 
solely in the act of God. In this sense the humanism of God is 
the foundation of all humanism and the revolution of God is the 
basis of all revolution. 31 In his revolutionary humanity Jesus 
transvalues all prevailing human values and effects a radical• 
reversal in the definition of humanness. It is amongst the ones 
whom the world has dehumanised and regarded as sub-human that 
Jesus reveals true humanness. 
Secondly and consequently, in Jesus true humanity is revealed as 
a particular kind of co-humanity, namely solidarity with the poor 
and lowly, but this solidarity does not have 





co-humanity is generally established in the radical being for and 
with others of Jesus of Nazareth, in whom it is finally 
established that to be human is to be together with and for other 
human beings. There i !::', no such thing ;as "humanity without the 
fellowman, humanity of man in isolation''.~2 Basic to humanity is, 
there-fore, "eye to eye:," enc:ounter and mutL1al ccimmuni cation with 
the other, issuing in the giving and receiving of assistance. 
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Consequently, all idealistic and individualistic definitions of 
humanity are to be rejected because true humanity can only be 
derived from the co-humanity of Jesus and must reflect this co-
humanity: 
What then is the common form basic to our humanity? Barth 
says that the criterion for determining this human form is 
Jesus Christ, the humanity of Jesus. Accordingly, many 
definitions of humanity are inadequate. For example any 
definition of man in which man is abstracted from the co-
existence of his fellowman is false. Any definition of man 
as a being in and for himself, as a being opposed to or 
neutral to his fellowman, or whereby his humanity is 
subsequently or secondarily determined rather than seen as 
an essential and primary aspect of being with fellowmen, is 
false or inhuman, 33 
Barth himself puts it positively: 
The humanity of man consists in the determination of his 
being as a being-with-the-other •.• It is not as he is for 
himself but with others, not in loneliness but in 
fellowship, that he is genuinely human, that he achieves 
true humanity ••• that he corresponds to his determination to 
be God's covenant partner. (CD 111,2 p243) 
Thus, in general, humanity that is not solidarity i3 inhumanity, 
but, in the light of Jesus' partisanship for and with the poor 
and lowly we must add that in particular humanity is to be 
defined as co-humanity with those who, with God, are marginalised 
in human history. It is consistent with Barth to assert that true 
humanity consists in solidarity with, and partiality towards the 
poor and lowly, in correspondence to Jesus' solidarity with the 
poverty of God in the world. For the present theme the 
revolutionary nature of this analysis of Jesus' act cannot be 
under-estimated. To assert that co-humanity with the poor is 
foundational to the definition of humanity, is to Judge all human 
activity that either favours the rich and powerful or 
inordinately emphasises the individual, to be inhumanity. 
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This definition of humanity also has profound ideological 
consequences for the limits and direction of human praxis. 
Amongst other issues, 
economic and political 
it raises questions about the ethics of 
systems which do not give primary 
consideration to collective existence. Such contemporary issues 
as the role of private ownership in society, poverty in 
developing countries, the function of computer-age technology and 
the economic disparities between the First and Third worlds all 
beg re-evaluation in the light of this definition of humanity 
which finds its Archimedean point in the humanity of Jesus. 
Barth's rejection of the capitalist economic order, and all 
reformist modifications thereof, is grounded in this concept of 
co-humanity. Capitalism denies this collective definition of 
humanity in two fundamental ways. Firstly, it endangers community 
with its emphasis on competition and secondly, the idea of the 
private ownership of the means of production is grounded in the 
principle of the exploitation of the weak by the strong and thus 
creates dependence rather than co-humanity. A theology which 
demands co-humanity with the poor and exploited is therefore, by 
nature, revolutionary in a capitalist world. 34 This does not, 
however, imply uncritical acceptance of the socialist programme -
that too comes under theological scrutiny, but from a different 
perspective. In the next chapter we will give closer 
consideration to these praxiological consequences. 
Thirdly, Barth gives wide definition to the terms poor, weak and 
lowly, insisting that these concepts are softened <made less 
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revolutionary> by either denying the starkness of the contrasts 
Jesus makes or reducing them to economic considerations alone: 
There should be no softening of the starkness with which 
wealth and poverty are contrasted and estimated even in the 
economic sense. But the Matthean version of the beatitudes 
guards us against another form of softening, i.e., the 
limiting of the concepts to a purely economic sense ••• It is 
true in every sense, irrespective of the concrete form taken 
by riches and poverty, that the hungry and thirsty and 
strangers and sick and captives are the brothers of Jesus 
in whom He Himself is either recognised or not recognised. 
(CD IV,2 p170; KD p189.) 
A reductionistic ~efinition would remove from the concepts their 
revolutionary breadth and cause an insufficiently radical 
transformation of humanity and creation. Barth's insistence is 
upon a revolution that not only faces economic disparities, but 
also deals with the moral and spiritual roots of human poverty. 
Unlike human revolutions, which tend to replace one form of the 
old order with another, Jesus' solidarity with the poor and lowly 
embraces and transforms the totality of human poverty, giving 
rise to a far more radical and true revolution. The danger here 
is that in a particular human situation the definition of poverty 
could become so diffuse that the radicality of God's revolution 
is lost. Positively, however, Barth's definitions liberate human 
revolutions from a narrow materialism by facing the deeper causes 
of human misery. Nonetheless, Barth ultimately fails to provide 
adequate tools with which to give concrete definition to these 
concepts in specific human contexts. It is not enough to proclaim 
God's general solidarity with the poor and lowly. The further 
step of defining God's solidarity with particular poor and lowly 
people in a given historical situation must also be taken. Just 
how Barth makes the transition from the general to the particular 
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solidarity of God is unclear. 
It is for this reason that the Barmen Declaration of 1934 has 
been criticised for not explicitly siding with the Jews in their 
oppression. Here we are confronted with an example of what 
Goll 1"i b! er has cal 1 ed II the bourgeois slant even to a theology 
antibourgeois in tendency",:3 e fo,~ despite a theology which 
demands solidarity with the victims of history, Barth has 
negligibly little to say about the suffering of the Jews in 
particular, or about the human reality of oppression in general. 
Apart from the recognition of Jesus' obvious partiality for the 
poor-, it is difficult to understand how a theologian who placed 
so much emphasis on the Scriptures could have missed the volume 
of reference to oppression in the Hebrew Bible. 36 Per-haps Lapide 
1. ,-,::, correct in his indictment r-elating to Bar-th's acknowledgement 
of failure regarding solidarity with the Jews because of 
interests that lay 'elsewhere': 
For a Jewish reader of the Barmen Articles, however, 
'elsewhere' can only mean the Church, anxiety for its 
identity, concern to differentiate it from the false claims 
of the Nazi Christians, precision in defining the Church 
evangelically. 3 ? 
Yet, as we shall see, Bar-th sought, at least theoretically, 
to replace the proletariat with the chur-ch as the locus of human 
r-evolution. His pre-occupation with the church is, ther-efore, an 
essential moment in the revolution of God. ConseqLH~ntl y, ethers 
have been more positive in their- assessment of Barmen. Cochrane 
descr-ibes it as a "trL.1ly revolutionary doc:ument"; 38 Bethge 
r-ega1-ds its emphasis on the fr-eedom of the Wor-d of God i:\S "the 
gr-ound and guarantor- of all psychological, personal, social, 
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economic and political freedoms''; 39 and de Gruchy concludes that 
the power of Barmen does not lie in the faithfulness <or lack 
thereof) of the Confessing Church but in ··~ts witne$S to the 
liberating Lord Jesus Christ''. 40 Nonetheless, the ambiguity of 
the theology of Barmen remains, for it is ultimately in praxis 
that theology is verified or disputed. Unless this theology 
enables true humanity within the specific social realities of its 
context it is open to abuse and misappropriation. As Villa-
Vicencio indicates, Barth was not unaware of this need. 41 
Yet the deeper reason for this difficulty with Barmen more 
probably lies in a class consciousness that prevented Barth <and 
others) from seeing the revolutionary imperatives of his own 
theology. If this were not so we would have expected him to 
develop the christological solidarity with the victim into a 
revolutionary solidarity amongst the victims as they seek to 
humanise their world. For a theology of the revolution of God· to 
form the basis of revolutionary human politics this step is 
essential. It is, however, a legitimate extension and not a 
contradiction of Barth's theology to develop this concept of 
solidarity amongst the poor and oppressed as they change their 
world from below. What is lacking in Barth is not the possibility 
of this theology but an emphasis on the oppression that demands 
such theology. In a word, Barth was neither Jew, nor poor, and 
the oppression he encountered was not unbearable; 
theology contains within it revolutionary potential. 
but his 
Fourthly, this solidarity of Jesus means judgement upon the rich 
and powerful and freedom for the poor and lowly: 
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God always takes his stand unconditionally and passionately 
on this side and on this side alone: against the lofty and 
on behalf of the lowly; against those who enjoy right and 
privilege and on behalf of those who are denied it and 
deprived of it. <CD II,1 p386) 
This decision of God, God's election in freedom to assume human 
form in the incarnation of Jesus, is both God's resounding No to 
all who oppress and dehumanise and God's clear Yes to the victims 
as they struggle for dignity and liberation. This does not imply 
divine legitimation for the praxis of the poor and lowly, nor 
does it mean that all rich are immoral and all poor righteous. It 
merely establishes the rightness of their struggle for liberation 
from poverty and oppression and provides the framework for that 
struggle. In short, it discloses the pu~pose of God as the 
establishment of true and full humanness for a dehumanised 
humanity. As we shall see the Yes and not the No is God's final 
word to humanity in Jesus, and the No is enclosed within, and 
spoken for the sake of the Yes. Once again, however, we note that 
Barth's emphasis was on the No to the ruling powers and not on 
the Yes to the oppressed. 
4.2.3 Jesus freedom and human options:The Indissoluble Antithesis 
Having clarified Barth's understanding of Jesus' identification 
with the poor it is vital to now recognise his relationship to 
particular human programmes. This is described by Barth in the 
third correspondence: 
The conformity of the man Jesus with the mode of existence 
and attitude of God consists actively in what we can only 
call the pronouncedly revolutionary character of His 
relationship with the orders of life and value current in 
the world around Him ••• He did not range Himself and His 
disciples with any of the existing parties ••• Nor did He set 
up against them an opposing party ••• Why His existence was 
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so unsettling on every side was that He set all programmes 
and principles into question. And He did this simply because 
He enjoyed and displayed, in relation to all the orders 
positively or negatively contested around Him, a remarkable 
freedom which we can only describe as royal. <CD IV,2 p172; 
KD p191. l 
This freedom makes Je.sus "a revolutionary far more radica1l than 
any that c:ame either before or after Him" because it c.orrespor1ds 
to God's ultimate freedom over all of history. 42 It bears 
testimony to the transitory validity of all human history? which 
becomes apparent when confronted by the God from whom that 
history derives its life and frontier. God alone is the ground, 
limit and orientation of all human programmes and principles, and 
Jesus is an "unmistakeable sign" of God's "·freedom and kingdom 
and over-ruling of history". 43 As such Jesus' task was not to 
start his own revolution but to reveal the true revolution that 
comes from God as the Archimedean point of all human history and 
pra>:is. 
Even Jesus' apparrent "passive conservatism" in permitting what 
should be set aside is no more "than a provisional and qLli:i.lified 
respect" for the human order··, whilst remaining superior to it. 
More si gni ·f i cant, ho\o'Jev~?r, are the points at which the 
superiority of Jesus finds expression in opposition to the 
prevailing order, revealing the intrusion of the revolution of 
God. With reference to the biblical analogy of the old and new 
garments and wine (Mk 2:21f) Barth concludes as follows: 
For Jesus, and as seen in the light of Jesus, there can be 
no doubt that all human orders are this old garment or old 
bottles, which are in the last resort quite incompatible 
with the new cloth and the new wine of the kingdom of God ••• 
All true and serious conservatism, and all true and serious 
belief in progress, presupposes that there is a certain 
compatibility between the new and the old, and that they can 
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stand in a certain neutrality the one to the other. But the 
new thing of Jesus is the invading kingdom of God revealed 
in its alienating antithesis to the world and all its 
orders ••• There is thus concealed and revealed, both in what 
we called the passive conservatism of Jesus and the 
individual signs and penetrations which question the world 
of human orders as such, the radical and indissoluble 
antithesis of the kingdom of God to all human kingdoms, the 
unanswerable question, the irremediable unsettle~ent 
introduced by the kingdom of God into all human kingdoms. 
<CD IV,2 p177; KD p197.l 
It is in this sense that Barth •till maintains the infinite 
qualitative distinction evident in the second edition of Romans, 
but now this distinction is christologically rather than 
theocratically grounded. Essentially, Jesus as the indissoluble 
antithesis does not deny the existence of human kingdoms or 
revol ut i ems, he merely exposes their relative character and 
points them to the kingdom and revolution of God as the basis for 
their e>i i stence. Hence, the revolution of God revealed Jesus of 
Nazareth, is established as the ground, limit and orientation of 
all human revolutions and practice. 
Historical forces and kingdoms are, in the final anal ysi !:I, 
confirmed rather than fundamentally shaken by human activities; 
their power can only be truly broken by the invasion of the 
kingdom of God: 
The little revolutions and attacks by which they (historical 
forces and kingdoms) seem to be more shaken than they really 
are can never succeed even in limiting, let alone 
destroying, their power. It is the kingdom, the revolution 
of God which breaks, which has already broken them. Jesus is 
their Conqueror. (CD IV,2 p544; KD p615.) 
Furthermore, if the kingdom of God revealed in Jesus Christ is 
supr·eme, it follows that the principalities and powers of this 
world have no ultimacy, because "God alone rules" the "kingdom of 
God is the only true kingdom". 44 
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This divine laughter rings out over the folly of all our 
crude or refined human imperialisms, and they will 
inevitably come to grief on this laughter. <CD 111,3 p160) 
God alone transcends the antithesis of necessity and freedom and 
to attribute ultimacy to anything other than Godself is idolatry. 
It is in this connection that Barth understands the destruction 
of the Third Reich: 
No sentence is more dangerous or revolutionary than God is 
One and there is no other like Him. All the permanencies of 
the world draw their life from ideologies and mythologies, 
from open or disguised religions, and to this extent from 
all possible forms of deity or divinity. It was on the truth 
of the sentence that God is One that the "Third Reich• of 
Adolf Hitler ~ade shipwreck. (CD 11,1 p444) 
God is both the ruler and goal of all created reality, and all 
human activities, powers and principalities serve as mere 
instruments of God's purpose, to establish true humanity. Human 
powers which deviate from fulfilling this purpose of God lose 
their instrumentality and legitimacy, and are radically called 
into question. And there is no human formulation to which this 
judgement does not ultimately apply. 
At this point it is necessary to understand Barth's concept of 
Das Nichtige (nothingness), for it is within this concept that he 
examines the evil which infuses all humanity and human systems, 
against which God revolts. 
Nothingness is the danger, assault and menace under which 
the creature as such must exist. <CD IIl,3 p3b3) 
As such it is neither God nor creature, but exists as an 
impossible possibility which can only become known to humanity as 
the antithesis of the will of God disclosed in Jesus Christ~ It 
is thus the object of God's judgement, that from which God 
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separates Godself and against which God asserts Godself. In 
short, it is that, in relation to which God exercises God's 
freedom as negation, to which the final and absolute No of God 
applies. Furthermore, the creature itself is incapable of 
achieving victory over nothingness, this is the domain of God 
alone, for God alone knows that to which God says No and 
therefore every human no cannot be more than an analogy to the 
great No of God. 
In the light of this the judgement of God, announced in the 
humanity of Jesus, on all human programmes, powers and 
principalities is a negation of the nothingness that endangers 
true humanity. It indicates that at any and every moment human 
action is threatened by nothingness, implying that all human 
programmes inevitably contain the seeds of their own destruction. 
Only God's revolution is radical enough to deal with nothingness. 
In the revolutionary freedom of Jesus nothingness is robbed of 
its power to 'nihilate': 
Because Jesus is Victor, nothingness is routed ~nd 
extirpated. It is that which in this One who was both very 
God and very man has been absolutely set behind, not only by 
God, but in unity with him by man and therefore the 
creature. It is that from whose influence, dominion and 
power the relationship between creator and creature was 
absolutely set free in Jesus Christ ••• It is no longer to be 
feared. It can no longer "nihilate". (CD III,3 p363) 
For human praxis this means freedom from the kind of captivity or 
slavish adherence to human political programmes and ideologies 
that inevitably leads to nothingness and the No of God. It 
implies a sober assessment of these programmes under the constant 
reminder that they all contain the seeds of their own dissolution 
and need to be transformed by the 'new from above', in order to 
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be liberated from being just another manifestation of the 
condemned old order. This praxis consists in bearing historical 
witness to the antithetical and revolutionary freedom of Jesus in 
relation to human orders and programmes. The question is, and 
upon the answer to this question Barth's theological projr~ct 
stands or falls: Does the human attempt to bear correspondence to 
I 
this revol 1.1t i onar-y freedom of Jesus lead to ideological 
neutrality and thus praxiological paralysis? Or does it provide a 
solid basis from which humanity can engage in a permanent 
str-uggle against nothingness? Does Barth adequately consider the 
ideological character of all human action? If so i- this 
revolutionary freedom of Jesus not simply Barth's theological 
alternative to what sociologists have called "epigtemological. 
vigi.lance"?4 e By this it is me.ant: does the No of Gcid fL11,ction as 
a permanent reminder and guard against the dangers of ideological 
captivity? In the next chapter it is argued that that 
revolutionary freedom of Jesus, coupled with Jesus' co-humanity 
with the poor, provides a radical theological basis from which to 
approach human formulations, programmes and structures with 
ideological suspicion and permanent vigilance. At the same time 
this theology also establishes a canon against which the humanity 
of human revolution can be measured in order to ensure that 
revolution remains humanising. The No of God can also not be seen 
apart from God's original and final Yes. 
On this basis Barth insists that his position does not imply 
"practical neutrality" because it demands costly testimony to the 
broken lordship of particular powers in specific histories. 4 • 
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This no of God is, according to Barth, not to be seen as either 
the first or last word but rather as a continual reminder that 
there is no organic compatibility between heaven and earth, 
humanity and God, God's revolution and human revolution: 
And we have to copy this divine separation in all that we 
~ave said so far. But again, we do not really know Jesus 
(the Jesus of the New Testament) if we do not know Him as 
this poor man, as this (if we may risk the dangerous word) 
partisan of the poor, and finally as this revolution~ry. We 
have to be warned, therefore, against every attempt to 
interpret and use him as a further and perhaps supreme self-
manifestation and self-actualisation of the old Adam. But 
this certainly cannot be our last word. (CO IV,2 p180J KD 
p 200. l 
Accordingly, the command of God, in correspondence to the life of 
Jesus, must be heard anew in every historical conte>:t, whilst 
continually under the reminder of the final incompatibility of 
God's kingdom with human kingdoms. This incompatibility cannot b~ 
used as an excuse for apathy. It is an eschatological reminder of 
the perpetual revolution of God which establishes the positive 
possibility of human revolutions participating in the new order 
'from above ' 1 rather than being an6ther form of the old order 
'from beloti-1'. Barth's emphasis on the freedom.of Jesus i~ thus 
meant to form the basis of truly revolutionary human praMis, it 
is, in theory, anarchistic rather than quietistic because its 
function is to provide a lever with which to ensure perpetual 
qualitative change within history. The relativising of all socio-
political revolution does not deny revolution per se. It locates 
the origin of all revolution in God alone, demanding 
participation in a more radical revolution in which the 
qualitatively new becomes reality. In practice, hoti-,ever, it. is 
open to quietistic abuse if the move from the general principle 
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of this revolutionary freedom to its particular application is 
not clarified. This is the subject of the final chapter. 
4.2.4 Jesus as the Yes of God: The final synthesis. 
For Barth, the fourth correspondence the humanity of Jesus bears 
to the nature of God is the most significant because in Jesus the 
No of God is ultimately only spoken for the sake of the final Ve$ 
of God to humanity: 
The decisive point to which we now turn is that the royal 
man Jesus is the image and reflection of the divine Yes to 
man and his cosmos. It is God's critical Yes, dividing and 
disclosing and punishing with all the power of the sword, 
And in this respect too, as we shall see, there corresponds 
to it the Yes spoken in the existence and act of the man 
Jesus. But, like the Yes of God, it is really a Yes and not 
a No, even though it includes and is accompanied by a 
powerful No. (CD IV,2 p180; KO p200-1.) 
Despite the intensity of the No, God only says No in Jesus in 
order to say Yes, indicating that God is not against, but for 
humanity. As echoed in the life of Jesus, the No of God is an 
integral moment in the disclosure of God's love and mercy toward 
humankind. Jesus reveals that God has originally and finally said 
Yes to humanity, and that the No is always spoken for the sake of 
the Yes. However, as Barth clarifies in a sermon in 1959 unless 
the concealed No has been heard the Yes cannot be appreciated. 47 
Markus, eldest son of Karl Barth, perceives this emphasis upon 
the Yes to be the most significant shift in his father's 
theology: 
If there was a decisive development in his thinking between 
1921 and 1935 - a change from the 'old' to the 'new' Barth, 
as some have said - it came in the recognition that God, 
ultimately, says 'Yes' to his creature. ~8 
Whereas in the dialectic period the No is dominant, now the No is 
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uttered for the sake of the Yes. 
It is within this framework that all we have said about Jesus 
must be Linder stood. J<~SUS' correspondence with God's 
powerlessness and humiliation in the world, his subsequemt 
radical solidarity with the poor and lowly, and his revolutionary 
freedom from all human programmmes, can only be properly 
understood as constitutive moments in God'$ affirmation of 
humanity and creation. God does all this for no other reason than 
to re-establish the humanity of humankind, 
dignity as the crown of God's creation. 
and exalt humanity to 
All this bears true 
witness to God as the One who loves in freedom. God's being in 
Godself and God's act for humanity cannot be separated. 4 ~ 
It is this love that finally distinguishes God's revolution as a 
positive movement from above, which does not destroy humanity but 
enables the transformation of human reality, and the destruction 
of all that brings misery and denies life. All deficient human 
definitions of power and humanness are negated for the sake of a 
true exercise of power and true humanness; all relative human 
powers, principalities and programmes are radically called into 
question for the sake of the permanent revolution of God, which 
alone can establish true justice and peace on earth. The Yes of 
God revealed in the human Jesus comforts humanity in its misery 
and al i t?n at. i cm , i::\SSUri ng it that despite all the 
mi sunder·standi ngs and di st.or ti ems of what it t.hi nks "to be goc,d 
and true and beautiful and comforting and helpful and liberating 
and redemptive", God in seeing their misery has brought the good 
news of its end. 50 Jesus indeed revealed the judgement of God, 
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but he most decisively disclosed the ''true and most inward will 
of God'' as the mercy of God and the coming of God's kingdom of 
The man Jesus is decisively created after God in the fact 
that He is as man the work and revelation of the mercy of 
God, of His Gospel, His kingdom of peace, His atonement, and 
that He is His creaturely and earthly and historical 
correspondence in this sense. ICD IV,2 p181; KD p201.> 
Judgement is thus a servant of mercy and love; the No is uttered 
for the sake of the Yes. 
For the analysis of the revolution of God this determines that 
God's revolution is ultimately for and on behalf of humanity and 
not against it. Everything God has done in Jesus is for the 
benefit of human beings, so that even when the No of judgement is 
uttered it is only as a servant of the Yes of grace. By analogy 
human revolution cannot ultimately be a negation, but rather an 
affirmation. In the image of the revolution of God, human 
revolution can only utter a No to a particular prevailing order 
because it finally wishes to say Yes to full and true humanity 
for all, even the enemy. Barth's reminder of the nearness of the 
revolutionary to God is still apposite, but not in the sense that 
the revolutionary corresponds to the negative No of God, but 
because of a positive correspondence to the Yes of God. The 
revolution that only says No is now by definition reactionary 
because it does not participate in God's original and final Yes. 
This revolutionary Yes is evident in many forms in Barth's 
theology, however, in order to better understand the nature of 




Justification; Yes as Hope; and Yes as Love. 
Yes as Justification 
It is within the reality of justification that the No within the 
Yes of the revolution of God is actually addressed to humanity. 
In the judgement of God announced in the death of Jesus Christ, 
humanity which has become captive to nothingness is destroyed. 
This is completed by the positive act of the resurrection in 
which the No of God to nothingness is confirmed, and the final 
Yes of God to humanity is revealed. In Barth's words, "the 
election of rejected man did not take place without the rejection 
of . elected man", but al so " we are dealing with the hi story in 
which man is both rejected and elEKted". l'!'.'l 2 Here again in the 
assertion of rejection for the sake of election the emphasis is 
on the No for the sake of the final Yes. The divine election and 
rejection of Jesus becomes the basis of the rejection and 
election of humanity, and in this way justification becomes the 
foundation of the possibility of radical human transformation. 
God does for humanity what humanity cannot do for itself in 
enabling a transformation from the old to the qualitatively new, 
in short, a revolution. 
But, because cf the connection between justification and justice, 
this revolution has profound consequences for human social 
praxis. Having heard the Yes of God humanity is compelled to seek 
the kind of social justice which is consistent with this gift of 
God. Villa-Vicencio argues that justification provides a radical 
Archimedean point for human praxis: 




religious community, can be more dangerous than the most 
revolutionary Marxist theory. When an oppressed people 
realise that their oppression is not willed by God, and that 
their political and economic liberation is an inherent part 
of their God given gift of salvation, they become an 
irrepressible constituency of people which no oppressor can 
afford to ignore.s3 
Justification becomes a 'spirituality of justice' which provides 
the theological infrastructure in the struggle for full and true 
human life. The source of justice is located in the divine 
revolution, giving the human quest for Justice and liberation a 
transcendent centre sufficiently radical to ensure real 
transformation. Human praxis emanating from commi~ment to this 
positive centre is bound to be more subversive and more 
threatening to human principalities and powers than the most 
radical autonomous human revolution. Further, as is argued in the 
next chapter, in the light of Jesus' identification with the poor 
and lowly, this spirituality of justice is to be exercised with 
and for marginalised humanity. 
Yet, if justification establishes the human perception of the Yes 
of God as the hinge around which all human praxis revolves, then 
it follows that the church has no more important a function than 
to proclaim this justification. This is the thrust of Barth's 
1938 essay entitled uRechtfertigung und Recht" in which he 
insists that the Church "must have the freedom to proclaim divine 
and the justness of the State will be measured 
according to the degree to which it grants this freedom. 34 In 
this way the church in solidarity with the poor replaces the 
Marxian proletariat as the analogous human locus of the 
revolution of God when it exercises the freedom to proclaim 
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justification as the reality that makes the true transformation 
of human society possible: 
Wherever this right is recognised, and wherever a true 
Church makes the right use of it (and the free preaching of 
justification will see to it that things fall into their 
true place>, there we shall find a legitimate human 
independence; tyranny on the one hand, and anarchy on the 
other, Facism and Bolshevism alike will be dethroned; and 
the true order of human affairs - the justice, wisdom and 
peace, equity and care for human welfare which are necessary 
to that order - will arise. 55 
I 
To hear and proclaim justification as the Yes of God is thus to 
locate, in history, the turning point which enables a 
qualitatively new human situation. The church can perform no 
greater service to the state than to proclaim this revolutionary 
transformation of human existence. To criticise the demonic 
actions of the self-justifying state is an inevitable moment in 
the declaration of justification through grace alone. And, as is 
evident in Barth's thinking from 1919, every state is under 
constant threat of this demonisation. Justification also judge~ 
all self-justifying human revolution, indicating that the just 
centre of both the state and its revolutionary alternative are 
positively proclaimed in the Yes of justification. At the risk 
of repetition, the No of criticism is uttered for the sake of the 
Yes of justice. 
Yes as Hope 
This Yes is the great hope - initially given to the victims of 
the earth in Jesus' identification with them; given also to the 
victimisers in Jesus' opposition to them; and shown to all in 
Jesus' revolutionary freedom from human options which inevitably 
contain the seeds of their own negation. But this hope is finally 
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established for all humanity in the resurrection of Jesus which 
does not introduce the great hope in contradistinction to the 
rest of Jesus' life and death, but rather confirms that the whole 
att of God in Jesus is actually, in the end, a Yes to humanity: 
, •• the relevance of the self-manifestation of the risen 
Christ is to be found always in the demonstration of His 
identity with the One who had lived and taught indicted and 
gone to His death. It is true that this One in His history 
and existence is the reconciliation of the world with God 
and therefore the new man, the dawning of the new creation, 
the beginning of the new world. But "it is not only in His 
resurrection that He is this. He became and was and is it in 
His life and death. The point about the resurrection i1 that 
in it He reveals Himself as the One who was and who is and 
who will be this in His life and death. (CD IV,2 p145) 
Consequently the purpose of God's self-revelation in the person 
of Jesus is to create for humanity a great hope which provides 
the foundation and stimulus for all human hope. Thus Barth in 
defining Christian hope as the ''coming alive of the promise 
incorporated in the world of men, or as the taking root of the 
promise implanted in it'' sees this hope as human correspondence 
in thought, word and act to the great hope present in Jesus: 
Where there is the great hope, small hopes are imperative 
for the immediate future. These hopes have their basis and 
strength only in the great hope. They are small, relative 
and conditioned. In their detailed content they may be 
mistaken and open to correction. But within these limits 
they are genuine hopes ••• But this necessarily means that he 
(the Christian) is daily willing and ready for the small and 
provisional and imperfect service of God which the immediate 
future will demand of him because a great and final and 
perfect being in the service of God is the future of the 
world and all men, and therefore his future also. (CD IV,1 
p121 revised.) 
Concretely, participation in the great hope established in Jesus 
means actively advocating and supporting human options that, in 
correspondence to the great hope, bring little hopes to humanity. 
On the other hand it demands the perpetual revision of the 
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relative little hopes of humanity so that they may more closely 
testify to the great hope. This human hope is made possible by 
the great hope established by the revolution of God in Jesus but 
it can never be equated with the great hope, it can only point to 
it. 
Hence, the revolution of God establishes the resurrection hope 
revealed in Jesus as the foundation of human revolution, which 
has the analogous possibility of being a little hope which points 
to this great hope. It is only because God has i nt.roduced 
something new into human history that people can dare to act in 
the hope of fundamentally transforming human society. 
implication this means that eschatological hope must, 
By 
of 
necessity, take historical form in the little hopes despite their 
relative and imperfect character. Human programmes and 
formulations can thus claim human allegiance in so far as they 
reflect this great hope. Equally, human activities that deny and 
foreclose hope are to be resisted in the name of the great hope. 
The message here is one of perpetual movement inspired by the 
great hope, a process which continues until the great hope is 
fully realised. Briefly stated, this means a permanent revolution 
grounded in God's revolution. 
Further, as Jurgen Moltmann emphasises in Theology of Hope, hope 
is eschatol<)gically grounded in the "future of Jesus Christ". 156 
For Barth this "c:omi ng again" of Christ does not mean a nei.-, 
"turni ng-·poi nt" in history, but rather a full clarification of 
what is already established: 
What is the future bringing? Not once more a turning point 
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in history, but the revelation of that which is. It is the 
future, but the future of that which the church remembers, 
of that which has taken place once for all. The Alpha and 
the Omega are the same thing.e7 
The memory of the christian community is, therefon?, central to 
the question of hope. It is the subversive memory of the act of 
God done once for all in Jesus that fuels human hope. This has 
far reaching ecclesiological consequence!:',. It r-escues the 
ritL1als, liturgies and traditions of the church from a cycle of 
meaningless repetiticrn, and restores them as rehearsals of hope 
for a liberated humanity. It is in this sense that Avila's 
description of the eucharist as the "school of liber .. ~tion" makes 
most sense.ea The atmosphere of hope affirmed i.n the life of the 
church both liberates and limits human creativity. It liberates 
creativity by providing a sound foundation and conducive context 
for acting; and limits cr-eativity by confining it to activities 
that share in Christ's humanising goal. The entire life of the 
church is to be a witness to the hope born in the revolution of 
God that human existence can be made more human. 
Nonethelass, unless hope can be located in particular human 
options in specific contexts it will be romantic utopianism. All 
talk of hope cannot be isolated from the choices human beings 
must make between concrete political programmes. Just as it makes 
no sense to talk of God apart from humanity, so also is it 
problematic to talk of the great hope apart from the little human 
hopes. What Barth does not provide are adequate analytical 
criteria by which political choices can be made. The method by 
which he made his choices is not explicit in his theology. This· 
will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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Yes as Love 
It is the love and mercy of God that forms the essential basis of 
the Yes of God from which every corresponding human yes is 
derived. As such, the revolution of God establishes love, 
particularly God's love, as disclosed in the humanity of Jesus, 
as the ground and motive of human revolutions. This observation 
does not differ markedly from B~rth's perception of the Great 
Positive Possibility in the second edition of Romans, but it has 
been more firmly grounded in two···natures ch1~istology. 
The being and the act of God are united in the concept of love: 
The statements 'God is and 'God loves' are synonymous. It 
is in this way, in this identity of being and love, that 
God reveals Himself to us as He loves us. <CD IV,2 p755; KD 
p859.) 
Consequently, because the essence of God's trinitarian being is 
love, not only is God free to love humanity, but human beings are 
liberated, by analogy, to love God and one another. This 
liberation to love occurs because God has included humanity 
within Godself, and Godself within humanity in the person, Jesus 
of Nazareth. God's love becomes the basis of human love as God 
exercises God's freedom to be the God of humanity in Jesus 
Christ. Love is then practised by Christians within the 
definition given to love in Jesus, which for Barth is threefold. 
Love is, firstly, electing love, qrouMded in the free act of God, 
and as such all human love is utterly dependent on this free 
election of God. It is through the election of divine love that 
God's Yes is decisively proclaimed. Barth rescues the doctrine of 
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election from its Calvinistic predestinarian strictures by re-
affirming election as an act of the One who loves in freedom. For 
humanity election is, therefore, a supremely liberating act of 
God, establishing the unconditional choice of God for humanity.~• 
Corresponding human love which finds its source in this 
liberating divine love is free to affirm the humanity of the 
other, even in a revolutionary situation. Such love can, in 
Lehrnanns words, "transform the passion of revolution so that:. its 
promises may in truth be born••.bo This both grounds and limits 
human actions that correspond to divine love. Human revolution 
cannot be entertained in isolation from this love. 
Secondly, this love of God is purifying love in that whilst it 
says Yes to the person it says No to the sin of humanity. In this 
sense love appears not only as grace but as judgement, and in 
both cases confirms the Yes of God to humani·ty which totally 
encloses God's No. For human love this indicates that although 
the final purpose of love is to say Yes, a constitutive moment in 
that Yes may of necessity be an intermediate No. But it i.-dll 
always be a No for the sake of the Yes. Thus, as is argued in the 
ne:·: t chapter, love cannot be idealistically conceived. The 
ambiguities inherent in all human actions cannot be regarded as 
an e:-:c:use for inaction. Humans must love even if the imperfect 
reflection of God's love in human praxis includes apparrently 
ambiguous elements. This is particularly true of a revolutionary 
situation where the human no may include the use of forcible 
resistance. 
Finally, the love of God is creative love in that it prompts and 
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awakens, through the power of the Holy Spirit, the genuine human 
freedom to love. To be loved by God is then to be given the 
freedom to love and thus the freedom to act in correspondence to 
the self-giving love of Jesus. In short, to love is to be 
liberated to participate in the Yes of God for humanity. 
Signi·ficantly, in describing the nature of the human act of love 
Barth does not equate love for God with love for humanity: 
If we try to love God as the neighbour it will not be the 
God who~ we are commanded to love. And if we try to love the 
neighbour as God, it will not be the neighbour we are 
commanded to love. If w~ are not to deviate from the divine 
revelation, if we really want to obey the one commandment of 
God, we can only love God and our neighbour. (CD I,2 p410) 
God is loved in the sense that the person is interested in God 
before al 1 else as the source of love: "God is fc>r him, and so he 
has no option but to be for Gc>d". • 1 Barth's purpose here, 
consistent with the first commandment, is to establish in 
principle the precedence 6f God, and love for God, but in 
practice it does not lead to a "heaven storming" idealism, rather· 
it implies that the human being makes the cause of God for the 
humanising of humanity his or her own.• 2 Failure to make this 
critical distinction between these two loves creates the danger 
of what MigLtez Bonino has called "radical monism" in which love 
for God collapses into love for the human other.•3 Such monistic 
theology would again fall foul of Feuerbach's charge of 
anthropomorphism, contradicting the intention of Barth's emphasis 
on the distinctiveness of God's being by reductionistically 
referring to God only in terms of the neighbour. The relationship 
between love for God and love for the neighbour is similar to 
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that b~tween the two natures of Christ in that, on the one hand 
they cannot be identified for this would deify humanity, while on 
the other hand to separate them would be to remove the efficacy 
of God's love in Jesus Christ from human history and thus negate 
the Gospel. This is more fully explored in relation to human 
praxis in chapte~ five. 
This love of necessity issues in specific acts of love toward the 
other to whom the christian relates. However love can never. 
become a generalised concept for all humanity - it always demands 
specific action toward those in historical proximity to the one 
who loves.~4 It is to these neighbours, in specific historical 
relationships to the christian that love mugt be shown by 
representing Christ in little analogies to His being and act. Yet 
again, the ambiguities of the human context do not absolve 
christians and the churth from taking historical options for the 
concrete actions which best correspond to divine love. The proper 
limits of this love are found, by Barth, in 1 Corinthians 13, 
namely, 
endures. 
love alone counts, love alone conquers, and love alone 
This excursus into Barth's understanding of love, nonetheless, 
demonstrates that whilst he firmly establishes God's love as the 
content of God's revolution and the positive basis of all human 
love, and further that love is ultimately obedience and thus 
action, he does not provide a hermeneutic whereby the theory can 
be translated into concrete action. God's revolution is a 
revolution of love and this love not only forms the ground, limit 
and orientation of human revolution, but also transforms human 
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revolution so that it corresponds to the revolution of God. 
Nevertheless, all we have here is a theological revolution. What 
remains to be seen is whether these abstract words can be 
translated into concrete ones in a particular human context. The 
real question is still: What form does love take in a specific 
historical context? What criteria are to be used in defining this 
form? In the next chapter it is suggested that concrete analogous 
human actions require the application of adequate social analysi$ 
to become reality. 
Two final points must be added which apply to all related in this 
chapter: Firstly, the revolution of God establishes the 
transformation of reality implicit in the God who has acted 
historically in Jesus Chri•t. As such this revolution is not mere 
theory, nor does it simply establish the possibility of human 
particioation in transformation. It predicates a real and actual 
transformation. Because the revolution occurs extra nos, that is, 
outside of us (humans) in Christ alone, does not mean that the 
real change has yet to take place. On the contrary, the act Qf 
God in Jesus effects a real transformation in the lives and 
community of those who take the No and the Yes of God sariously. 
The revolution of God is the praxis of God in the Marxian sense 
of not merely enabling understanding but actually critically 
transforming reality. 
Secondly, it would be a travesty of Barth not to point out that 
the christology explicated here is not Christ, as Schellonq aptly 
clarifies: 
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Barth distinguished quite sharply between Christ and 
Christology in order to guard against the supposition that 
proceeds as if Christology were an answer or a method to 
open all locks, as if it were more than a clarificaton of 
the conditions under which we who wait upon Christ can speak 
about the One who is awaited and strain toward hi~ in 
expectation. 68 
To read Barth apart from an ongoing encounter with Jesus Christ 
in the midst of the perplexities of human history is to deny the 
theologia viatorum character of Dogmatics. Theology i$ ultimately 
done, not prior to human action as a theoretical discipline, nor 
after action as hindsight analysis, but, with Christ in the heat 
o·f human conflict - within "the sound of guns booming". 66 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE REVOLUTION OF 600 AND HUMAN REVOLUTION. 
This analysis began with the praxis of Karl Barth and must now 
return to the questions raised about concrete human praxis by the 
theology of the revolution of God. Ultimately, theology must 
become praxis for it to truly be theology. The central question 
is: Can this Barthian concept of the revolution of God inspire, 
enable participation in, or contribute to the human revolutionary 
processes that dominate reality in many developing countries? Or 
is it a romantic theological notion that holds out false hope to 
oppressed people? 
Clearly, Barth falls into neither the utopian nor conservative 
perspectives on revolution. 1 On the one hand he does not 
romanticise revolution by ignoring the harsh reality that every 
revolutionary inevitably becomes a victim or executioner, a 
heretic or an oppressor. 2 On the other hand, he does not demonise 
revolution as contrary to history and extrinsic to the Gospel. On 
the contrary, his christology is essentially revolutionary, and 
his emphasis is on the transformation of human existence. The 
revolution of God is grounded in a realistic assessment of the 
dangers of, and the necessity for revolutionary human action. 
The dangers are confronted with God's resounding No~ whilst the 
necessity is a function of God's final Yes to humanity and 
creation. Consequently, the thesis tested in this chapter can be 
formulated as follows: Barthian theology, understood from the 
perspective of the revolution of God, alNays requires 
revolutionary praxis which, under extreme conditions, not only 
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condones but demands participation in the forcible resistance of 
a particular status quo. Of necessity, consideration is given to 
Barth's understanding of the use of violence as an ultima ratio. 
Three qualifications of this thesis are necessary: Firstly, Barth 
did not develop a human revolutionary theory. His own radical 
politics was most prominently expressed in resistance to Hitler's 
tyranny, which was not a classical revolutionary situation. It is 
of no avail, therefore, to search Barth's writings for an 
analysis of the 'nuts and bolts' of revolutionary praxis. His 
pre-occupation is not with revolution for the sake of ~he 
effective transformation of a particular political situation, but 
for the sake of faithful correspondence to God's revolution. 
Secondly, human revolution can never be more than an analogy to 
God's revolution, permanently under the same judgement of God 
applicable to all human programmes. God's revolution provides the 
framework within which human revolution can occur. God's 
revolution is the criterion by which jugdement can be made as to 
what is, and is not, revolutionary. The overriding concern here 
is to ensure that human revolution remains an instrument of God 
for the humanising of existence. An attempt to analyse these 
limits and frontiers placed on human revolution is central to 
this concern. 
Finally, the Barthian perspective posits a permanent revolution. 
Unlike particular revolutionary situations where it is possible 
to distinguish between 'pre' and 'post' revolutionary phases, 
Barth proposes a revolution that is a perpetual process which 
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culminates eschatologically. In this sense Barth's approach 
exhibits the anarchistic tendencies analysed in this chapter. 
5.1 THE COMMAND OF GOD. 
Fundamental to human praxis is hearing and obeying the command of 
God. This command cannot be formulated as a universal casuistry, 
originating in God, independent of the particular human situation 
to which it applies. On the contrary, for Barth the formulation 
of answers to ethical questions happens where the divine, 
vertical dimension intersects with the corresponding (analogous) 
human horizontal dimension. Another reminder that God cannot be 
spoken of without simultaneously speaking of humanity: 
Face to face with the ethical question, we have not only to 
consider a vertical dimension, the event or rather the many 
events of the encounter between God's command and human 
action in a singularity and uniqueness which cannot be 
anticipated and which scorn regimentation. For these very 
events all take place - as can be seen both from the divine 
command and human action - in a definite connexion. Only as 
an event takes place in this connexion is it, in all its 
mystery, the ethical event. Only as the vertical intersects 
the horizontal can it be called vertical. (CD III,4 p17; KD 
p17-B) 
Consequently, the hearing.and obeying of the divine command is a 
contextual matter which cannot be pre-decided, and which occurs 
where humanity takes both its situation and the Word of God 
seriously. This relationship between the divine and the human 
liberates orthodoxy from casuistic strictures, and ascribes the 
real freedom to command to God, and the real freedom to obey to 
humanity. 
In terms of this thesis the command of God is the aspect of God's 
revolution which provides the content for human action, whilst 
the specific form of that action is defined in the actual 
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situation of the praxis. Barth's argument with Brunn~r was that 
he (Brunner) failed to clarify that the source of the command of 
God can only be found in the being and act of Godself (and thus 
in the revolution of God), and not in naturally discernible 
orders of creation. 3 It is worthwhile noting that it was not 
until after the publication of Ethik in 1928 that Barth 
recognised the contradiction between the concept of the orders of 
creation and his christological emphasis. For Barth there is no 
foundation for command of God and human ethics other than Jesus 
Christ, the revolution of God. God, as the true revolutionary, 
can neither be bound to pre-determined dogma nor to universally 
discernible orders of creation. The One who loves in freedom is 
free to command and, analogously, humanity is free to obey. 
This relationship between form and content is most evid~nt in 
Barth's reversal of the traditional law-gospel paradigm. 4 Here 
the gospel is seen a$ the pre-eminent foundation and content of 
the law, whilst the law is the form the gospel takes in a 
particular human situation.e For the present thesis the gospel of 
grace disclosed in Jesus Christ is the revolution of God which 
frames the content and determines the form of human praxi3. The 
gospel as content limits and inspires human action, whilst the 
law as form determines, in a particular context, the shape the 
gospel takes. Hence law is the result of the intersection between 
the divine command and a specific human situation. 
5.1.1 The Grenzfall. 6 
In continuity with the freedom of God to command Barth develops 
the concept of the Grenzfall. The implicit assumption regarding 
the command of God is that, in most situations, the content of 
the divine command is reasonably apparent, and the form of the 
corresponding human action is not easily disputable. Nonetheless, 
the Grenzfall or borderline situation, recognises that in a given 
context God is free to command in a way which conflicts with 
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previous commands. In these Grenzfall situations the human 
context itself becomes determinative. This poses the question of 
how to recognise a Grenzfall situation, and what criteria apply 
in discerning the command of God under such conditions? It is 
here that adequate social analysis becomes a necessary integral 
moment in theological discourse. 
Consequently, the Grenzfall is Barth's image for contextual 
theology. Barth differs from contemporary contextual theologians 
in that for him the Grenzfall is an exception, whereas contextual 
theologians regard every situation to be exceptional. Contextual 
theologians, doing their theology within oppressive situations, 
regard the whole of life to be a Grenzfall situation. For this 
reason they have methodologically integrated models of social 
analysis into their theology. Whilst Barth implicitly uses social 
analysis, this analysis is neither made explicit in his method, 
nor recognised as important in the discerning of the command of 
God. This critique will receive greater attention later in this 
chapter. The present point is that Barth did implicitly take the 
location of human praxis seriously. Yet, it is not 
contradiction of Barth to extrapolate this seriousness into a 
comprehensive social analysis. Nonetheless, the need for the 
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Grenzfall does demonstrate the difficulty of moving from content 
to form in a particular context. 
For the relationship between the revolution of God and human 
revolution the command of God and its corollary the Grenzfall ha~ 
important consequences. Primarily it indicates that human 
revolution, as an analogy to divine revolution, is ine:-:tricably 
bound to the revolution of God. Legitimate revolution result~ 
from the hearing of the divine command which shapes analogous 
human pra~: is. Secondly, it suggests that the form of human 
revolution cannot be anticipated in advance, but must be 
discerned where the horizontal of the human context and the 
vertical r::or, tent of the divine command intersect. It is to the 
r::or, ter, t of the divine command as it impinges upon human 
revolution that attention is now given. 
5.2 HUMAN REVOLUTION UNDER THE NO OF GOD. 
In the sub-section which examined the theological proposition of 
Jesus as the 'indissoluble antithesis' it was concluded that 




incarnation of God's eschatological critique of human 
This No of God de-absolutises human structures and 
The function of this aspect of God's revolution is 
the present concern. 
5.2.1 A Theological Hermeneutic of Suspicion. 
Theologies of liberation have indicated that the proper genesis 
for liberating theological theory and praxis is the suspicion 
that humanisation, in a specific human context, demands radical 
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~ransformation. 7 For these theologians, because of the reality of 
oppression, the central pre-occupation is a suspicion that the 
prevailing theology and ideology serves the interests of the 
dominant classes of society. This hermeneutic of suspicion arose 
out of an encounter with Marxist and Neo-marxist thinking and was 
appropriated by theology because of its liberative potential. 
The contention here is that Barth provides within his christology 
a mechanism which serves a similar purpose to this hermeneutic of 
suspicion. Barth's own encounter with Marxism that as a reminder 
of what was always inherent within the Judeo-christian corpus.a A 
combination of the No implicit in the revolutionary freedom of 
Jesus and the No directed to the rich and powerful in Jesus' 
identification with the poor and powerless provides a radical 
basis upon which to approach all 
ideological traditions with suspicion. 
dominant theological and 
This impression is compounded if additional attention is given to 
Barth's ommission of the abundant reference to oppression and 
God's decision for the oppressed in the Hebrew Bible.Y The point 
is: theologians do not have to look beyond their own discipline 
to discover that to suspect human activity, particularly that of 
the rich and powerful, is implicit in the biblical witness. This 
is a structural consequence of the 'nothingness' that perpetually 
threatens all human thought and actions. 
The function of this suspicion is a broadened by Barth to 
include a similar apprehension of revolutionary activity opposing 
a particular status quo. Conscious of the need to secure 
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qualitative change, Barth suspected every human revolution of 
merely creating a new form of the old order. Hevol ut ion i !ii 
suspect because it tends to re-arrange the old, whilst the 
prevailing dominant ideology is disputable because it is the old 
Further, this critique of revolution does not originate 
from a mediating position betNeen an existing order and its 
antithetical revolution. Rather, revolution is questioned from 
the left, because of its tendency to effect an insufficiently 
radical transformation of reality. Consequently, the Barthian 
hermeneutical suspicion not only requires the negation of human 
thought and programmes which re-inforce domination, but also 
demands of revolutionary praxis permanent vigilance against the 
danger of replacing one form of domination with another. This 
relates to Barth's critique of ideology. 
The Critique of Ideology. 
The question of ideology is tackled under the he~ding: "The 
Lordless Powers". In that context ideologies are defined as the 
consequence of the idolisation of human formulations. This occurs 
when a human option is objectified and given super human status: 
his <the humans) hypotheses become for him theses behind 
which he no longer ventures to go back with seeking, 
questioning, and researching. He thinks that they can be 
thought and formulated definitively as thoughts that are not 
merely useful but intrinsically true and therefore binding. 
His ideal becomes an idol mal:ing of his ideas an 
ideology. (CD IV,4 p225) 
This negative assessment of ideology bears some kinship to the 
Marxist concept of false consciousness, which defines ideology as 
·follows: 
Ideal ogy is 
realities, a 
a false consciousness of social and economic 




given social class. 10 
This 'illusion' creates an inverted image of human real_ity where 
human hypotheses and systems are given divine ontological status. 
Both the Barthian and Marxian critiques of religion follow 
Feuerbach at this point. In this religious inversion humanity 
creates a god in its own image and then proceeds to worship 
that god. 11 For Barth that god is an idol, for Marx it represents 
false consciousness. Barth's quest is for the true God, 1,o,hi 1st 
Mar>: seeks true consciousness independent of reference to the 
divine. Religion is ideology, for Barth, because it is an 
idolatrous objectification of human hypotheses about God. 
Such ideology implies captivity which demands rigid human loyalty 
and judges all human others in terms of whether or not they 
subscribe to the same standpoint. It contains within it "the 
solution not only to the personal problem of his own life but to 
each and all the problems of the whole world". 12 These ideologies 
manifest themselves in society in at least three ways: Firstly, 
they are invariably expressed as an 'ism' with the followers 
being called 'ists' or 'ians'. Secondly, they are characterised 
by slogans or catchwords which capture human imagination. On this 
point Barth makes the following important addendum: 
Let us not be deceived: we all listen to the most varied 
catchwords, we all use them more or less merrily, and in so 
doing show that we ourselves are people who have been struck 
and stabbed and snared by systematised ideologies. (CD IV,4 
p227) 
Barth's awareness of the virtual impossibility of evading the 
ideological trap is significant. Ideology cannot be escaped and 
all human life is, to some degree, influenced or controlled by 
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it. The only humanly possible option, under the pervasive shadow 
of ideology, is to exercise permanent vigilance against 
ideological captivity. Whilst idealistically the quest for 
i deol ogy--free, and idol atry·-free human ,:\ct ion is the 
eschatological goal, realistically the entanglement of humanity 
with ideologies requires permanent awareness of the No of God in 
Jesus Chr· i st. As intimated in the previous chapter, this is 
Barth's theological alternative to what Maduro terms 
"epistemological vigilance". 1 ::s Bc:\rth thus locates this permanent 
vigilance against the dangers of ideological captivity in the No 
of God implicit in the revolutionary freedom of Jesus. This No is 
a persistant reminder of the final incompatibility of human 
praxis with the praxis of God. Hence, human activity is placed in 
its proper relative perspective. God's is the only absolute 
revolution. Human revolutions are, by definition, de-absolutised. 
Functionally, this relativising of pra~is liberates humanity for 
the quest towards the humanising transformation of reality. It 
guards against captivity to programmes or structures which limit 
human potential. 
Finally, ideology makes use of propaganda to apologetically 
advertise itself and polemically discredit all opposition. 
Propaganda is juxtaposed by truth which simply bears witness to 
itself and needs no manipulative assistance. Critical evaluation 
of this concept of truth reveals a remnant of the liberal 
idealism which holds to the possibility of the discernment of a 
'truth' devoid of ideological content. Nonetheless Barth's 
reminder that even the church has not escaped the use of this 
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propaganda implies that this truth is only eschatologically 
accessible, and yet it remains as a historical critique of all 
human perceptions of truth. The point remains: under the 
revolutionary No of God humanity cannot rest e~sily with any 
human formulation or programme. Permanent resistance is not only 
allowed but demanded. 
Yet, this negative definition of ideology is not intended to 
devalue the necessity for the development of human hypotheses. 
Rather it is a warning against the dehumanising of these 
hypotheses by allowing them to degenerate into captivity and 
idolatry. Barth's passion is to keep these hypotheses hu~an. It 
is the No of .God's revolution alone which provides the 
sufficiently radical permanent critique necessary for this t~sk. 
Similarly, and under the same heading, Barth approaches the 
issue of technology by recognising the inherent value of the" 
human harnessing of the energies of creation for the benefit of 
humanity as a whole, and the demonisation of technology when it 
no longer works for humanity but against it. On the one hand he 
says about humanity: 
He is to make the earth his own world, to shape it as the 
theater and tool of his historical existence... He 
investigates them (the forces of nature>, makes them usable 
by him, and puts them in his service as their lord. This is 
what he has learned to do, and has done, with increasingly 
astonishing range from the distant past •.• to the extent 
that he does this as real man, that is, man loved by God, 
created good by him and ordained by him to do this work. (CD 
IV,4 p230) 
However, humanity forfeits this lordship when these natural 
forces are misused: 
If, however, he slips out of this service, he thereby 
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forfeits the lordship that should be his. <CD IV,4 p228) 
This occurs when, in alienation from God, creation's energies are 
used to satisfy selfish human wants and goals, thus actually 
reversing the lordship: instead of controlling natural power 
humanity becomes captive to its control. Again the No of the 
revolution of God stands as an eschatological reminder of the 
dangerous tendency inherent in human behaviour, where that which 
was intended to liberate becomes a source of bondage. Technology 
is only legitimate in so far as it is instrumental to the 
humanisation of life. 
Hence, the No of God's revolution is not a negation of human 
action, neither is it intended to lead to relativistic paralysis 
or ethical quietism. On the contrary this No sets the limits 
within which human activity is truly human, and specifies the 
boundaries 
destructive. 
beyond which this action becomes inhuman and 
Human revolution is only possible within these 
limits. Yet, God's final word to humanity is the Yes. The No 
describes that which falls outside of the parameters of true 
humanity as defined in this Yes. 
with regard to human revolution, 
It is logical, therefore, that 
the ethical content of the Yes 
should be our primary focus, for the No can only be known as that 
which the Yes excludes. 
Further, the No of God is a persistent reminder to humanity that 
it can never achieve its own affirmation. Revolution becomes 
Titanism when it is a self-justifying, self-affirming act. God's 
grace alone provides the basis for human justification and 
affirmation. Human activity can never do more than bear analogous 
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testimony to this affirmation. 
He (humanity) can and should affirm his existence, but only 
on the presupposition and in relation to the fact that it is 
already affir~ed by his creator who is his primary and true 
Lord ••. He has simply to praise God with his activity .•• he 
has not been commisioned to exercise the initiating and 
consumating function of God. (CD III,4 p552> 
This echoes Barth's appreciation of the quality of simple praise 
to God in Mozart's music, which does not try to prove anything. 14 
The critical point is that political praxis, and thus human 
revolution, is not a primary but a secondary activity. It does 
not seek to justify itself, only God Justifies or Judges it. 
Whatever support human beings give to these secondary programme$ 
can only legitimately occur under the decisive No 6f God. This is 
the force of Barth's emphasis on justification by faith through 
grace. He practically expresses this in terms of the espousing of 
particular forms of human progress: 
The Christian community both can and should espouse the 
cause of this or that branch of social progress or even 
socialism in the form most helpful at a specific time and 
place and in a specific situation. But its decisive word 
cannot consist in the proclamation of social progress or 
socialism. It can consist only in the proclamation of the 
revolution of God against "all ungodliness and 
unrighteousness of man" (Rom 1:18), i.e. in the proclamation 
of His kingdom as it has already come and comes. (CD III,4 
p545; KD p626) 
The reference here to Barth's positive confidence in human action 
will be more fully analysed below. Nevertheless, in this 'time 
between the times', God's Yes is inseparable from the 
eschatological reserve of the No of God. Here the revolutionary 
nature of the Yes of God becomes apparent. For God only says No 
to all relative human proposals in order to even more distinctly 
say Yes to the perpetual search for better analogies to the 
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praxis of God revealed in Jesus Christ. The No announces God's 
revolution against the static acceptance of the status quo, in 
order to say Yes to human praxis as a dynamic search for true 
humanness. This is the theologia viatorum which permanently 
searches for a more humanising analogy to God's revolution. 
Herein lies the anarchistic dimension of Barth's position. 
Anarchism? 
In concluding the analysis of human revolution under the No of 
God, it is necessary to examine this anarchistic dimension of 
Barth's approach more closely. Anarchism is an ambiguous concept 
which requires clarification. Anarchy has been positively defined 
as "the <:>rganisation of society on the basis of voluntary co-· 
operation, and especially without the agency of political 
institutions, i.e. the state 11 • 1 =s This form of anarchy is not 
synonymous with chaos, but seeks a human society devoid of 
authoritarian structures. 
human authority. 
Inherent i~ a general suspicion of 
In Barth's theology, because no human system can sati$fy the 
demands of the revolution of God, a confrontation with the 
existing bearers of power is always implicit. Even when passjve 
participation in a system is chosen, that participation is 
provisional and temporary. This permanent human rebellion, in 
correspondence to the No of God, regards all human states to be 
pione to the abuse of power, thus incurring the judgement of God. 
The negation of this abused authority is necessary to the ongoing 
quest for full and true humanity. The permanent confrontation 
between light and shadows, justice and injustice, which impressed 
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Barth in Mozart's music is an image of this anarchistic 
passion. 16 
Accordingly, Barth shares with anarchists an abiding suspicion of 
the misuse and abuse of power by the state, but his high regard 
for the state reflects a rejection of the anarchist's historical 
hope of ''organising society on the basis of voluntary co-
operation''. 16 Consequently, Barth's anarchy is eschatological 
anarchy, proclaimed not as the political answer to vexed human 
structural questions, but as the only response radical enough to 
challenge the existing human relations of power in the worlJ. 
Ellul, who acknowledges his indebtedness to Barth, concludes that 
every modern state is totalitarian because of the overwhelmingly 
powerful means of control at its disposal. Consistent with the 
present analysis of Barth, he thus opts for a similar anarchist 
post ion: 
It seems to me that an anarchist attitude is the only one 
that is sufficiently radical in the face of a statist 
system. For there can be no question of being able to 
overcome the system by changing it from within ••• The point 
is not to enforce a particular vieH of society but to 
establish a counterbalance, a protest, and a sign of 
cleavage. In the face of an absolute power only total 
confrontation has any meaning.' 7 
Here Ellul takes Barth's No to its logical conclusion. For if the 
true state can only be expected eschatologically, it is the same 
as denying final legitimacy to any historical state system. The 
diffe~ence is that Ellul is more pessimistic than Barth of 
finding a provisional and temporal state form which corresponds 
to the revolution of God. 
Yet, neither for Barth or Ellul, does this disavow participation 
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in the ambivalent and ambiguous human movements of protest and 
resistance. It is here that human analogies to the final Yes of 
God must be discerned and obeyed. 
5.3 HUMAN REVOLUTION UNDER THE YES OF GOD. 
Marx points out the difference between praxis and practice. The 
former, from a foundation of critical analysis, engages in the 
actual transformation of reality, whilst the latter is 
unreflected, uncritical human activity re-inforcing rather than 
changing human conditions. 18 In Barth, the Yes of God reflects a 
similar concern to ensure that human action contributes to 
qualitative change. The contention is that only God's revolution 
provides a sufficiently radical foundation for human praxis. 
Human revolution is only able to realise the "impo!!sible 
possibility" of establishing a r,eN order if it is an analogy to 
the final Yes of God. 19 The limits of human revolution are 
defined by the No of God, whilst the content and orientation of 
revolution are determined by God's Y~s. The only True Revolution 
is that which comes from God. All legitimate human resistance and 
rebellion can only be participation in this Revolution. 
Consequently, Barth uses the more modest words of resistance, 
rebellion and revolt, rather than the word revolution for hum~n 
activity: 
Necessarily, those who pray for the future sanctifying of 
God's name cannot accept its present desecration ••• it will 
be a humble and resolute striding on earth and in time along 
a way that corresponds in its direction to the act of God 
which has already taken place in Jesus Christ ••• Rebellion 
and resistance against the regime of vacillation are 
necessary. It is the command of the hour, of every hour. 
This command is issued to us in this time between the times, 
and we have to obey it ••• It means revolt. The overthrow of 
the regime cannot be an affair of our action. That God 
himself will overthrow it is what we pray for. But to rise 
up in rebellion against this regime •.• is something hu~anly 
possible. 20 
Human rebellion is the continuous participation of people in the 
overthrow of das Nichtige and all its temporal manifestations. It 
is the eschatological command addressed to believers in the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus, calling them to be co-
transformers of reality with God. Humanity is not required to 
undertake the humanly impossible task of initiating revolution; 
rather, their calling is to claim the 'freedom in limitation' 
given to humans under the command of God. This freedom to hear 
the command of God means that humanity must take seriously what 
it can do: 
The command of God is the call to wake up, to recognise 
ourselves and to take ourselves seriously in the totality of 
what we can actually do. (CD III,4 p626) 
This calls human beings, as those who have discerned the Yes of 
God in creation, to use their potential as unique creations of 
God. The real question is not should humanity revolt, rebel or 
resist but what form must this action take. The Yes of God to the 
transformation of creation has been irrevocably announced in 
Jesus. Participation in this revolution is net an option but a 
command for christians. Such theology is bound to be both 
threatening to the dominators and inspiring to the dominated cf 
society. Villa-Vicencio concludes: 
It is this use made of God's revolution ••• which makes 
Barth's theology an inspirational source for sustained human 
participation in a continuing human quest for something more 
than any particular society can deliver. 2 i 
Yet this rebellion, resistance or revolt is not revolution in the 
strictest sense. The difference between revolution and rebellion 
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has been posited as follows: 
A revolution is a sucessful rebellion; the victory has been 
won and the new system has been established. A rebellion is 
a continual revolution; the new system is ever in process of 
being established and the victory or victories are still 
ahead. 22 
In Barthian terms the notion of revolution as sueessful rebellion 
is reserved for the act of God alone. God overthrc>ws, humanity 
resists and rebels in corresponding participation in this divine 
r-evolution. Hence, it is not possible for humanity to 
successfully conclude a rebellion. God alone can transform the 
continual rebellion of humanity into true revolution. In the 
light of these definitions Barth's theology can, from a human 
perspective, best be described as a theology of rebellion. Yet, 
for Barth, the act of God in Jesus Christ has already established 
the revolutionary new system. Therefore, in terms of Barth's 
understanding of God, his theology is truly a theology of 
revolution. Human praxis is made possible by the victory of Jesus 
Christ and is ffleaningless apart from it. Rebellion is impossible 
apart from the revolution of God within which that rebellion 
finds its orientation and content. 
Camus, the Algerian existentialist, formulated his thinking on 
rebellion as follows: 
In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebel lion must 
respect the limit it discovers in itself - a Ii mi t where 
minds meet and, in meeting, begin to e>:i st. Rebellious 
thought, therefore, cannot dispense with memory: it is a 
perpetual state of tension. z::s 
Both Barth and Camus discern in human existence an imperative 
toward rebellion. However, whereas Camus finds the source of 
human existence in community itself, Barth locates the origin of 
1.37 
human existence in the original and final revolution of God. 
Further, Barth replaces Camus' memory of this human community 
with what Metz has termed the "dangerous memory of Jesus 
Christ". 24 This forms the link between hope, as described in the 
previous chapter, and rebellion. Rebellion is the concrete human 
consequence of hope which is aptly defined by Alves: 
It is the presenti,ent that iaagination is aore real and 
reality less real than it looks. It is the suspicion that 
Reality is much more complex than realism wants us to 
believe; that the frontiers of the possible are not 
determined by the limits of the actual, and that in a 
miraculous and unexpected way life is preparing tha creative 
event which will open the way to freedom and resurrection. 2 e 
In the revolution of God the "frontiers of the possible" are 
determined by the subversive memory of the Yes of God disclo$ed 
in Jesus. The future promised by this dangerous memory gives 
courage to humanity to hope for something better than an unjust 
statu:s quo, and inspires the quest for greater justice. The 
recollection of the past event which establishes the revolution 
of God, gives impetus to the present struggle for a future which 
exceeds human expectation. 
It is only those whose hope is endangered that can recognise the 
subversive nature of remembering the Yes of God. On 1 y t.h1::ise 
threatened by despair are sufficiently separated from the cause 
of oppression to challenge its foundations: 
Only the oppressed can be creative. Why? Because only the 
oppressed have the will to abolish the power presuppositions 
which are at the root of their oppression. 26 
Oppression is the ground in which hope emerges and grows into 
creative analogies to the revolution of God. 
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Essentially, Barth insists that the revolutionary transformation 
of human life and creation cannot happen from within alone. The 
rebellion within corresponds to the dangerous memory of the 
revolution of God from without. The bearer of this analogous 
rebellion to the revolution of God is the church of Jesus Christ. 
5.3.1 The Church as the Locus of Human Revolution. 
As noted in 4.3.4 above the church as the bearer of the 
revolutionary message of justification replaces the Marxian 
proletariat as the human locus of revolution. This approach to 
human revolution has the principle weakness of being 
discipleship ethic. As Moltmann has pointed out: 
Christocratic ethics can only be discipleship ethics. It is 
ethics for christians but not christian ethics for the 
state. It is political ethics of the christian community but 
not christian politics of the civil community. 27 
Barth's relocation of the locus of revolution has little 
significance for oppressed people alienated from the church. He 
could also be accused of being overly optimistic about the 
revolutionary potential of the church. Nonetheless, in a context, 
such as South Africa, where the judeo-christian tradition is a 
determinative factor in the self-understanding of the vast 
majority of people, such an ethic provides a powerful social 
lever. A revolutionary ecclesiology challenges to the church to 
become the humanising influence it is intended to be. An analysis 
of the revolutionary function of the church in Barth is, 
therefore, apposite. 
It is the church to which God has given the primary 
responsibility of proclaiming the Yes which makes true and full 
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human life possible. To proclaim and live out divine 
justification has profound social and political consequences for 
the life of the church and the world it serves. Essentially it is 
the church which, through proclaiming justification, ~ccepts 
responsibility for giving definition to what is truly human and 
also the task of ensuring that human action remains human. The 
church's message is the human analogue to the divine revolution 
which establishes and makes possible true humanity. It holds the 
key to the Archimedean point, the true revolution which heralds 
the establishment of a qualitatively new humanity. 
Barth understands the civil or political community from the same 
christological perspective as the christian community, the 
church. Both these communities have a common centre in Jesus 
Christ which makes the true church and the true state possible. 
The christian community, however, forms the inner circle of the 
wider human society because it, unlike the state, has an acute 
awareness of the centre of the existence of both the state and 
the church in Je~us Christ. 29 This special awareness of the 
revolution of God, as the hinge on which the entire civil 
community hangs, places profound political responsibility upon 
the church. It means that the church will be the community within 
the wider society which persistently reminds the state of its 
origins, limitations and possibilities. As this disturbing 
influence, the church will always be, more or less radically 
calling the existing order into question in the interests of a 
new state, which bears closer anal~gy to the kingdom of God. The 
decisive word the church will speak is therefore a Yes to the 
140 
true state which corresponds to the reality of Jesus. The church 
is not against the state but for it as it fulfils this 
revolutionary task. It acts and speaks for the ~ake of true 
government as an instrument which enables true humanity. This is 
illustrated by Barth's insistence that the Second World War 
against Germany was actually being waged for her. This Yes, 
however, necessarily includes the anarchistic No to the status 
quo always in need of qualitative transformation. The true state 
can only be eschatologically conceived, and therefore the church 
is destined to remain this anarchistic influence throughout human 
history. 
In pursuing its task the church actually takes the state more 
seriously than the state regards itself, and consequently, in 
order to effectively perform this task the church must remain 
the church. 29 It must maintain its special existence so that the 
hope that comes f~om the revolutionary Yes of God can always be 
heard by the political community. Barth can thus say: 
The christian community shares in the task of the civil 
community precisely to the extent that it fulfils its own 
task. 30 
This special existence of the church never implies 'splendid 
isolation'. On the contrary, special existence means greater 
engagement with and responsibility for the civil community. It is 
the task of the church to remind the state of the revolutionary 
nature of the divine justification disclosed in Jesus as the 
foundation of its existence. This is the proper content of the 
church's submission to the state. Ethically, this means that 
Justice as the human analogy to divine justification is the basis 
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of the true state. Further, this justice is more fundamental than 
law and order, which must not be permitted to subvert the 
interests of justice. Justice, and not order, is the human Yes 
which corresponds to the divine Yes of justification. The only 
acceptable order is the one which serves justice. 31 The pursuit 
of Justice is also the basis of human revolution. It is in 
struggling for justice with the oppressed and poor that human 
revolution reflects the content of divine revolution. 
Consequently, the pursuit of justice denies the state the ''self 
justifying legitimacy that ends in the tyranny of order''; and 
denies the revolution a ''self justifying rebellion which ends in 
the tyranny of anarchy''. 32 Because it is God alone who justifies, 
only a passion for justice can be the proper basis for the state 
and the revolution. In terms of the current debate, ha$ damning 
consequences for ideologies of national security which subvert 
justice in the interest of stability. 
The bearer of justice for the poor. 
Yet, the understanding of justice requires greater clarification 
in the light of the analysis of Jesus as the revolution of God. 
Primarily, in correspondence to Jesus, justice means justice for 
the poor, marginalised and excluded of the community. It is not 
merely justice in general that forms the basic criterion for 
proper government and true revolution. Rather, it is justice for 
the poor and marginalised in particular that does so. It is here 
that Barth does not explore the consequences of his own theology. 
The church can only remind the civil community of the need fer 
justice towards the alienated of history if it is the church of 
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the poor, oppressed and marginalised. What is lacking in Barth is 
an analysis of the class location of the church which exposes its 
inability to be the disturbing community required by the 
revolution of God. If the church consists of, or is dominated by, 
people whose class position is removed from underclasses, then it 
will have a propensity toward paternalistic social action, and 
when challenged will tend to opt for order above justice. Yet, if 
the church is truly the church of the poor and marginalised then 
it is relatively free of the bourgeois influences that paralyse 
its action. Then it can truly witness to the revolution of God 
revealed in Jesus Christ; it can be the human locus of the divine 
revolution and enab'le the subversive hope that generates creative 
human analogies to that revolution. Ultimately, the church too 
needs to be reminded of its nature and purpose and it is only the 
poor and excluded who can adequately fulfil this role. Molt.mann 
is thus correct in pointing out that the "true churc:h" as the 
locus of the revolution of God does not exist. 3 ~ In order to 
liberate this ecclesiology from being "theologically illusory" it 
is necessary to affirm Sobrino's point that "the poor evangelise 
the church". 34 
The church corresponds to the act of God in Jesus Christ in so 
far as it makes the poor and marginalised the criterion of its 
existence. If Jesus is ultimately to be known as "this ... 
partisan of the poor, and finally as this revolutionary",':!!'e then 
it is the church that is correspondingly partisan that is capable 
of bearing witness to the revolution of God. No neutrality can be 
entertained by the christian community where justice is at stake: 
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Precisely because the church knows about justification which 
we cannot attain by any means for ourselves, she cannot 
remain indifferent. She cannot remain "neutral" in things 
great and small where justice is at stake, where the attempt 
is being made to establish a poor feeble human justice over 
against overwhelming, flagrant injustice. 36 
Hence, it is impossible for the church to escape involvement in 
the class struggle that Marx identified as central to the process 
of human history. The only variable is the class whose interests 
the church will represent. It is a legitimate extrapolation of 
Barth to assert that for the church to truly be the church it 
must take its place, in correspondence with Jesus, amongst the 
poor and marginalised. In so doing the church by nature rejects 
the sacralisation of power and chooses permanent conflict with 
human power. Having chosen solidarity with the powerless it 
confronts the power.of the state with the powerlessness of God in 
Jesus Christ. This is the perpetual confrontation between the 
power of the human state and the revolutionary reversal of all 
definitions of power and humanity by the revolution of God. 
Love, co••unity and revolution. 
This is related to the discussion above concerning the 
fundamental form of humanity as co-humanity with the poor and 
marginalised. 37 This understanding of community enables Barth, in 
principle, to radically reject capitalism and affirm socialism. 
It is the great positive possibility of loving one another in 
human community that forms the foundation for resisting existing 
inhumanity in the interests of true humanity: 
To love one's neighbour means, for Barth, 
"individual egoism" to "collective egoism" in 
structures that are national and global. 38 
to move 
political 
The human love which corresponds to the love demonstrated by God 
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in Jesus Christ characterises the christian community, and 
defines the ideological opti6ns it may provisionally adopt or 
passionately resist. The church as the inner circle of the human 
community by practice and proclamation represents the kind of 
economically and politically inclusive community consistent with 
God's renewing purpose for creation. The very act of including, 
and adopting the perspective of the discarded members of the 
civil community will in a revolutionary way, undermine the 
identity of that civil community. Such an inclusive community 
will be regarded as subversive by any state founded upon 
political or economic inequality. 
This has wide economic and political consequences. It challenges 
the presuppositions undergirding the economic exploitation of 
Africa and Asia by First World powers; it questions the 
assumptions relating to private property~ labour and technology 
philosophies; and it probes the effectiveness of state control 
of the means of production -all in the interests of true humanity 
established by the revolution of God. 3 ~ 
True humanity, as defined by the praxis of Jesus, can only be 
realised as the church affirms and manifests the humanity of 
those dehumanised by the civil community. Hope for humanity does 
not come from those already included, but from the margins of 
life, from those who are regarded as less than human. The 
challenge is for the christian community to actively seek total 
humanity for all human beings, beginning with the dehumanised. It 
is the practice of this inclusive love-in-community, under the 
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command of God, that safegLtards human r..evolution from devouring 
itself. 
Choosing between hu•an options? 
As indicated, the correspondence of the church to the praxis of 
Jesus not only represents to the state the need for justice for 
the poor, but also acts as an eschatological reminder of the 
provisional and temporal nature of every state and human system. 
It does not permit the self-deification nor the idolisation of 
the state, neither does it allow itself to be lured into 
absolLttising any particular political option. On the contrary, 
the church will always de-absolutise ideologies and systems that 
are in danger of claiming total loyalty from human persons. 
Nonetheless, the church accepts direct and joint responsibility 
for the state. In the words of Barmen: 
It (the church) draws attention to Sod's Kingdom (Reich>, 
God's commandment and justice, and ~ith these the 
responsibility of those who rule and those who are ruled. 40 
This requires the church to be actively engaged in the ongoing 
formulation of human political alternatives that bear closer 
analogy to the revolution of God in Jesus Christ: 
On the basis of the judgement which it has formed it will 
choose and desire whichever seems to be the better political 
system in any particular situation, and in accordince with 
this choice and desire it will offer its support here and 
its resistance, 4 ' 
Despite the revolutionary nature of the church's existence it is 
not absolved from making specific choices for or against 
particular human options in every context. This precludes the 
church from setting itself up as a 'third way' or an 'alternative 
community'. The church, as the disturbing inner circle of the 
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political community, must ground its rebellion in terms of 
particular human programmes: 
The christian community both can and should espouse the 
cause of this or that branch of social progress or even 
socialism in the form most helpful in a specific time and 
place and in a specific situation. (CD III,4 p545) 
Nonetheless, the church always lives uncomfortably with its 
provisionally chosen option, recognising that its final word 
consists in the proclamation of God's revolution which calls 
every human activity into question in the interests of true 
humanness. Barth clarifies the relationship between the faith of 
the christian community and human world-views: 
Faith is radically dialogical to them. In the last respect 
it has never taken them seriously, even though it has 
fiercely opposed them or intimately allied itself to them. 
It accepts no responsibility for their foundation, 
structure, validity or propagation. It moves within their 
territory but cannot be detained at their frontiers. (CD 
III,2 p9) 
Because the church is the inner circle of the civil community it 
inevitably moves within the territory of human formulations and 
world-views. It will be influenced by them, radically opposed to 
them, and even passionately committed to them. But their 
significance will not be decisive for the church. They will be 
embraced or rejected in so far as they are p~rceived to be 
analogous to the revolution of God. But judgements must be formed 
and options supported or resisted. 
The critical question now is: By what criteria does the church 
make its decisions regarding the best available human 
formulations? What is the concrete form that the action of thi$ 
revolutionary christian community must take in a speci ·f ic 
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context? Barth answers this question in Christian Community and 
Civil Community by suggesting twelve ways in which political 
kingdoms could parabolically reflect the kingdom of God. 42 These 
analogies broadly point to the form of democratic socialism which 
in a particular context offers the greatest justice for all. This 
form of socialism represents, for Barth, "the best present - and 
hence provisional - parable of the kingdom of God. 114 ::s However, 
Barth does not make explicit the implicit social-analytical 
process by which he arrives at these analogies. Therefore, it is 
possible to assume that these analogies are arbitrary ideological 
constructions reflecting more of Barth's bias than the gospel 
i tsel ·f. Even within the corpus of Dogmatics, where Barth tackles 
the question of the specifics of ethical action, the four 
criteria given are general and abstract and difficult to apply to 
a given human context. These criteria are: that ethical activity 
should: 1. Be open or changable. 2. Be self-validating in the 
sense of being a search for the best analogy to the absolute in a 
specific situation. 3. Be communal in that it relates primarily 
to humanity in community. 4. 
providing a useful starting point, 
clear insight into the social 
theology. 
Be concrete action. 44 Whilst 
these criteria do not provide 
analysis implicit in Barth's 
Analyses of Barth's method have revealed that his analogies and 
other political and economic conclusions have been reached 
through the application of a form of Marxist socio-analytical 
method to the context, in conjunction with continuous dialogue 
with the gospel. 4 e To mention two examples: Barth was critical of 
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capitalism on the basis of a theological and political analysis; . 
and his position on communism and East-West relations reflects a 
political analysis unusually incisive for his time and context. 
The difficulty is th~t due to Barth's over riding concern with 
theological integrity he failed to explicate the sociological 
analysis indispensible to his conclusions. Liberation theologians 
have counteracted this tendency by insisting on the determinative 
nature of context for human praxis. Hunsinger is thus correct in 
concluding that the basic difference between Barth and the broad 
stream of liberation theologians lies in differing ruling 
passions: 
This 
The controlling passion of Barth's theology can be read as a 
passion to love God and fear God above all else, whereas 
that of Gutierrez's theology can be read as a passion to 
love one's neighbour as oneself. 46 
neither means that Barth was unconcerned about the 
liberation of the oppressed, nor that liberation theologians 
ignor.e love for God. Rather the difference is one of emphasis 
resulting from the diverse contexts and class positions of the 
theologians. For Barth, to love God means to love God as God is 
in Godself, and as God has revealed Godself in God's act of 
liberation for humanity in Jesus Christ. Thus, it is God who 
initiates the process of human liberation and this God cannot be 
loved in isolation from an active participation in the human 
quest for full freedom. In terms of this thesis this comparison 
may be restated: Whilst Barth was predominantly concerned with 
the revolution of God as the Archimedean point for the 
transformation of reality, the liberation theologians are more 
urgently engaged in the actual human revolutionary struggles in 
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the midst of which they do theology. The danger in Barth's 
approach is that the 'nuts and bolts' of human liberatory 
struggles suffer at the hands of theoretical integrity, whilst 
liberation theologies run the risk of collapsing love for God 
into love for the neighbour, confining hope to human 
possibilities. Hunsinger suggests that Barth provides a necessary 




tendency ••• can only be resisted ••• by 
Barth's unqualified precedence for God's 
In addition, the only way to resist the "dangerous tendency" to 
neglect the dynamics of human praxis, is by marrying the 
"unqualified pr·ecedence for God's Word" with an unequivocal 
commitment to the liberation of the poor and oppressed. Both the 
are fundamental to theological discourse. The divine command is 
not discerned in a vacuum but in a real human conte>: t, an 
analytical understanding of which is indispensible to hearing 
that command. What is needed in Barth's theology is the 
methodological inclusion of his implicit social analysis. 
Conversely, if the propensity of human rebellion and revolt to 
merely give new form to the old oppressive reality is to be 
overcome, then the revolution of God provides a definitive hinge 
which liberates human praxis to enable a qualitatively new 
humanity. In short, Barth and liberation theologians need one 
anc,ther. The latter need the farmer's. reminders about the 
concrete situations and causes of human oppression. The former 
needs the latter's challenge, on the basis of God's revolution, 
to ensure that human praxis contributes to being and staying 
human in history. Mc:Afee Brown, in comparing Barth and Gu$tavo 
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Gutierrez concludes as follows: 
If Barth brings an implicit praxis to his examination of 
Scripture, Gutierrez brings an implicit biblical orientation 
to his examination of praxis. 4 • 
Both approaches recognise the constant interaction of human 
praxis and the divine Word. Differently stated, Barth ensures 
that praxis remains human; liberation theology ensures that 
humans actually engage in praxis. Barth's pre-occupation with 
theological integrity provides human praxis with its most sound 
and revolutionary foundation. The revolution of God ultimately 
provides the christian community with a radical spirituality of 
liberation. 49 
5.4 VIOLENCE: THE LIMITING CASE.~0 
A vital question regarding the humanisation of human life under 
the revolution of God concerns the possibility of the use of 
violent resistance in the processes of human revolution. In the 
light of the revolution of God the question is not, is violence 
ever theologically legitimate but, does God's command of the hour 
ever require the use of violence as a means of perpetuating quest 
for the establishment of analogies to the revolution of God on 
earth? 
Nevertheless, any analysis of the que$tion of violence must 
recognise the historical failure of the church to consistently 
and adequately explore non-violent strategies as alternatives to 
the violent resolution of conflict. Significantly, Barth does not 
engage in a thorough discussion of the dynamics of pa~sive 
resistance. Yet, it is argued below, that he does regard pacifism 
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as a permanent challenge to the ultima ratio of violence. 
For Barth, the use of forcible resistance raises ~n ethical 
dilemma in which humanity must choose between respect for human 
life as an absolute principle, and the absolute of the command 
of God. This dilemma indicates the pertinence of the Grenzfall 
ethic to the revolution of God. The Grenzfall is not intended to 
be an escape route for the frailty of humanity, but a guarantee 
of the freedom of God. It is not a Kierkegaardian teleological 
suspension of the ethical but rather a recognition of the 
relativity of all human ethics and submission to the absolute 
ethic of God's command. The Grenzfall means that there comes a 
moment that humanity cannot hear the command of God in the w~y it 
is normally heard. Deference to the supremacy of the revolution 
of God is required. 
Consequently, respect for human life cannot become an absolute 
principle lest it become a kind of second God. Human life is a 
loan from God and human freedom only occurs within the context of 
the freedom of God: 
Life is no second God, and therefore the respect due to it 
cannot rival the reverence owed to God. (CD III,4 p336 ) 
There may, therefore come a time when obedience to God, as an 
ultima ratio, requires violent resistance in a specific human 
situation. In this sense Barth differs from the traditional Just 
war position. His concern is not primarily with the successful 
use of violent resistance, but with faithful correspondence to 
the command of God. The question is not will violence effectively 
resolve conflict, but does faithful participation in the 
revolution of God require it? Yoder comments as follows: 
Barth adds what he calls a "distinctively christian note". 
If a people is called by God to defend its national 
existence, then this defence must be carried on without 
regard for its effectiveness or success,e 1 
Violent resistance can furthermore be undertaken with good 
conscience because it constitutes obedience to the Yes of God in 
that conte>:t. That is why Barth could regard the allied 
participation in the second World War as a "righteous cause".""2 
He saw that the only way in which the proclamation of divine 
justification through Jesus Christ as the permanent revolution of 
God in Germany (and Europe> could c6ntinue, was if Hitler was 
violently overthrown by the allied forces. Violent re9istance to 
Hitler was intended to make it possible for people to again 
perceive the Original Revolution which establishes true humanity. 
However, the interpretation of violence as a 'righteous cause' to 
be undertaken with 'good conscience' is open to the abus~ of 
becoming a crusade which does not adequately recognise the guilt 
of humanity implicit in a theology of the cross. Barth's American 
critics demonstrated a deeper awareness of this dimension, 
suggesting that war was to be undertaken ''without the benefit cf 
conscience" or 11 \.'Ji th a bad and tortured conscience for the sins 
that have brought us to this tragic necessity of fighting''. 5 ~ 
Vet, although Barth is net unaware of the guilt implicit in 
viol ~?nee, it is Bonhoeffer who deals realistically with the 
quest i cm: 
When a man takes guilt upon himself in responsibility, and 
no responsible man can avoid this, he imputes this guilt to 
himself and to no-one else; he answers for it; he accepts 
responsibility for it. He does not do this in the insolent 
presumptuousness of his own power, but he does it in the 
knowledge that his liberty is forced upon him and that in 
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this liberty he is dependent upon grace. Before 
the man of free responsibility is justified by 
before himself he is acquitted by his conscience; 




In this way the option for violence is a consequence of the human 
freedom derived from the freedom of God which accepts the 
responsibility before God that this freedom implies. Human 
participation in violent revolutionary prc:>c:esses in 
correspondence to God's revolution does not minimise the 
responsibility the human bears for his or her actions. 
This does not mean that Barth was unaware of the "unequivocal 
ugliness" of war.e'.'le Ultimately, war is worse than other kinds of 
killing which entails "killin<J without glory, without dignity, 
without chivalry, without restraint, and without reserve". 30 The 
roots of violence lie in the struggle for the acquisition of 
economic power motivated by material selfishness, i,.,hi ch is the 
very "nothingness" that the revolution of God seeks to destroy. 
Thus, despite the wartime emphasis on the Yes of the resurrection 
and the victory of Jesus, Barth insists that violence can only 
be considered by those who have carefully examined and been 
tempted by the absolute pacifist option. With regard to the use 
of violence Barth concludes: 
All affirmative answers to the question are wrong if they do 
not start with the assumption that the inflexible negative 
of pacifism has almost infinite arguments in its favour and 
is almost overpoweringly strong. (CD III,4 p455; KO p520> 
The question about violence, consequently, relates to the 
choosing, under the command of God, of the best human analogy to 
the divine revolution. Violence is always an opus alienum and, if 
used, must more closely correspond to the humani~ing telos of 
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God's revolution than the pacifist position. It must aim to 
establish the kind of justice that corresponds to divine 
justification, and the quality of human community that bears 
analogy to Trinitarian love. 
We can now summarise important conclusions regarding the use of 
violence in human revolutionary processes under the revolution of 
God. 
Firstly, the use of violent resistance as a human response to the 
divine revolution cannot, in principle, be ruled out. The 
refusal of the violence option cannot, therefore,.be posited upon 
absolute pacifism but rather upon a perception that such a 
refusal is consistent with the supreme revolution of God. The 
option for violence remains a possibility, and those who have 
chosen this way as an ultima ratio cannot be dismissed as having 
denied God's revolution. On the contrary, they may be the ones 
who discern the command of God most clearly. 
Secondly, violence can only be advocated as participation in the 
revolution of God when it is regarded to be consistent with the 
Yes of God to all humanity. As such violence, cannot be directed 
primarily against human persons in a spirit of hatred or 
bitterness, but against the evil that threatens humanity, and 
thus for the benefit of all 
enemy must be respected. 
even the enemy. The humanity of the 
Here the law of love is of supreme 
importance. The passion of forcible resistance is to be 
transformed by the humanising love of Jesus, which alone i$ 
capable of ensuring that revolution continues to be orientated 
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towards being and staying human in the world. For this reason the 
cost of violence is to be constantly evaluated in the light of 
the humanisation of the struggle for justice. Yet the moment may 
come when the violent resolution of conflict is both the option 
most consistent with love, and the least costly path to follow: 
The church knows God's anger and judgement, but aiso it 
knows that His anger lasts but for a moment, Nhereas His 
mercy is for eternity. The political analogy of this truth 
is that violent solutions of conflicts in the political 
community... must be approved and supported, and if 
necessary suggested by the christian community - for how 
could it possibly contract out in such situations. 87 
Nonetheless, this can only be the case when violence is ''for the 
moment the ultimate and only possibility available''; 38 and, 
following Bonhoeffer, when this option is chosen the implicit 
human guilt and responsibility are accepted. 
A corollary of this, indicated in the last quotation, is that the 
fear of the violent option cannot be used to avoid political 
responsibility. In commenting on the Scottish Confession Barth 
warns: 
Whether the repressing of tyranny will be a matter of 
forcible resistance or not, is not something which can be 
decided in advance. But active resistance as such cinnot and 
may not be excluded out of fear of the ultiaa ratio of 
forcible resistance. 89 
God must be free to command in any given human context and human 
beings must be equally free to obey. Neither the content of God's 
command nor the form of human response can be pre-decided. 
Human action must give analogous historical shape to the 
revolution of God no matter how ambiguous that action may be. 
The imperative to choose the best human politics cannot be 
sidestepped. 
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This finally brings us back to the social analysis required to 
hear the command of God in a particular situation. As noted 
above, Barth fails to provide adequate tools for the task. To 
recognise the moment when other options have been exhausted, and 
to assess the human cost implicit in forcible resistance, 
requires not only theological skill and faith, but socio-
analytical insight. Without such insight human participation in 
armed resistance is bound to be romantic and destructive. 
In summation, under the God's Yes and No the transformation of 
human society is entrusted to human movements of protest. This 
affirmation of humanity by God gives creative freedom to humans 
to make and keep their context human. This implies active 
participation in the human politics that best corresponds to the 
Yes of God in a particular human situation. For the proper 
performance of this task appropriate socio-analytical tools are a 
necessary moment in theological discourse. The development of 
these tools in constant conversation with the content of the 
revolution of God is the imperative facing theology today. 
Further to avoid the concrete political consequences and choices 
(however drastic they may be) implicit in discerning human 
correspondences to God's revolution is to ~ail to be human. 
Nevertheless, no human correspondence can responsibly be 
discerned apart from the eschatological reservation of the No of 
God. This No demands permanent vigilance against the ideological 
captivity that leads human revolutions to ''devour their own 
children''.~0 This occurs when only the Yes of God is heard. The 
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No provides a theological reminder of the provisionality of all 
human praxis, and keeps the transformation of reality human. Yet, 
to use this No as an excuse for indifference or neutrality is to 
abuie its intention. This occurs when only the No of God is 
heard. 
The Yes of God which includes the No is does not imply a kind of 
balance or equilibrium. God's decisive word is Yes, and in this 
Yes establishes God's revolutionary transformation of humanity 
and creation. But as long as oppression and injustice born of 
human hubris persists, the hearing of the Yes is made possible by 
the judgement of the No. 
In principle the theology of th~ revolution of God leads to 
corresponding revolutionary human praxis. If God's final purpose 
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ABSTRACT 
The paradox at the centre of Barth's theology is that, on the one 
ha.nd, humanity is incapable of speaking of God, whj. J. st on th<::·) 
other ha.nd, it is imperative for humanity to speak of God. Thi!::; 
dilemma is resolved by God's act for humanity in Jesus Christ, 
giving rise to a human response cf faith and obedience. Humanity 
can speak of God only because God has revealed Godself. Hence, 
all theology and praxis begins doxologically, in praise for God's 
initiative of grace. 
This thesis proposes that Barth's perception of this ini~iative 
of God is best e>:pn?sse:·d in the:· concept of the revolution of God, 
which provides a paradigm from which to recover the liberative 
and humanising intention of his theology. In this concept Barth 
simultaneously speaks of God and humanity, without confusing the 
deity of God and the humanness of humanity, providing a way 
beyond both quietism and the legitimation of power, choosing 
instead permanent confrontation with power in the interest of 
true humanisation. 
Such an approach is suggested by Paul Lehmann in a 1972 article 
desc:r l. bing Barth as a "t.he:~ologj_an of permanent revolution". 
Also, in the same year, the doctoral thesis of Frederich-Wilhelm 
Marquardt,TheoJogie und Sozialismus: Das Bespiel Karl Barths, 
devotes significant attention to Barth's concept of 
revolution of God within his analysis of Barth's socialism. 
the 
This 
thesis is a more extensive analysis of the revolution of God 
within the wider framework of Barth's theology. 
l 
Methodologically, this thesis develops from praxis to theory and 
back under th~ assumption that it is praxis which verifies 
theory. 
The first chapter uses the method of 'theology as biography' to 
theologically analyse specific activities in Barth's life, 
enquiring whether his praxis justifies deeper examination of the 
concept of God's revolution. His appreciation of Mozart provides 
a frame of reference within which three events are considered: 
Firstly, his response to the 1914 manifesto signed by German 
liberals legitimating the military policy of the Kaiser; 
secondly, his refusal to make the oath of allegiance to Hitler; 
and finally, his understanding of the inclusion of Hungary in the 
Eastern bloc. 
With this foundation, the seiond chapter analyses the development 
of the concept of the revolution of God in his early theology, 
from the pastorate at Geneva and Safenwil to professorship at 
Gottingen and Munster. Barth's quest for a way of simultaneously 
speaking about God and humanity without separating or uniting the 
two is prompted by disatisfation with liberal and religious-
socialist models, grows into a dialectic approach, and matures in 
an analogical method based on Anselm of Canterbury. 
In chapter three analogical thinking is examined as the 
epistemological basis of God's revolution. In the Anselmian 
concept of God as aliquid quo nihil maius coqitari possit Barth 
finds an understanding of God sufficiently radical to be the 
Archimedean point upon which all reality depends. Here God is 
understood as the self-existent One who, by grace, takes the 
initiative for humanity in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. The 
being and act of this God finds its historical analogy in the 
Chalcedonian two-natures christology. 
Jesus Christ, as the revolution of God, is the exclusive subject 
of the fourth chapter. Here Chalcedonian christology is analysed, 
and the implications of Barth's understanding of the person of 
Jesus are explored. It is argued that Jesus embodies the 
revolution of God which seeks to bring true and full life to-
humanity. The historical correspondence of Jesus, as the 'iroyal 
man', to the being and act of God leads to thiree conclusions: 
Firstly, a human community based on radical solidarity with the 
poor and lowly; secondly, the de-absolutising of all human 
thinking and action under the No of God; and thirdly, the 
decisive Yes of God to the human search for the best historical 
analogies to God's revolution. 
Fi.nal ly.1 the fifth chapter deals with questions about the 
relationship between God's revolution and human revolution. Here 
it is concluded that, read from the perspective of the revolution 
of God, Barth's theology always demands revolutionary human 
praxis geared to the transformation of reality. 
1 7 DEC 1987 
